Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China\u27s WTO Accession Saga by Bhala, Raj
American University International Law Review
Volume 15 | Issue 6 Article 9
2000
Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China's WTO
Accession Saga
Raj Bhala
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation




CHINA'S WTO ACCESSION SAGA
RAJ BHALA*
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CHINA CASE STUDY .... 1470
A. THE ACCESSION PROCESS ................................. 1471
B. EARLY HISTORY: THE CURIOUS WITHDRAWAL ............ 1477
C. THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD MEMBERSHIP .................. 1478
* Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law, The George Washington
University Law School, 2000 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20052. Tel. 202-
994-2266. Fax. 202-994-9446. A.B. (Economics), Duke University, 1984; M.Sc.
(Economics), London School of Economics, 1985; M.Sc. (Management), Oxford
University, 1986; J.D., Harvard University, 1989. Marshall Scholar, 1984-86.
I am grateful to Professor Jeffery Atik, Suffolk Law School, for inviting me to
write this essay and present it at an American Society of International Law meeting
in February 2000, and to Professor Jeffrey Dunoff, Temple Law School, for his
support in publishing it.
I also am grateful to the following friends for the opportunities they provided
to present earlier drafts of this essay: my GW colleagues, Professors Ralph Stein-
hardt and Sean Murphy, at a GW adjunct faculty lunch on 22 March 2000; Profes-
sor Michael Vitiello, McGeorge Law School, at a McGeorge faculty lunch on 10
March 2000; participants at a Workshop on Lao Legal Reform in Vientiane, Laos
on 15 March 2000 and at a World Bank lunch in Washington, DC on 25 May
2000; and participants at a G.W. L.L.M. alumni reunion lecture at Oxford Univer-
sity on 22 July 2000. I am thankful for the many helpful comments and sugges-
tions I received in all of these venues.
As always, my cosmopolitan research assistants at GW did a first-class job
helping me edit this essay: Mohammed Zakirul Hafez (Bangladesh); Kris Hansen
(Iowa); Preeti Kapoor (Michigan); Khattar Torbey (Lebanon); and Christian Ulrich
(Germany). Where would I be without them?
Finally, I cannot help but note this is the first piece written following the birth
of my daughter, Shera. I am ever so pleased to dedicate the essay to her in the hope
that she may one day experience the wonder, awe, and humility that I have in trav-
eling through China.
1469
AM. U. INTL L. REV.
D. THE FAILED EFFORT TO BECOME A FOUNDING WTO
M EM BER ................................................. 1481
E. ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS IN 1996-98: THE AMERICAN
POSITION ................................................. 1487
F. ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS IN 1996-98: THE DEBATE IN
THE PRC, CHINESE CONCESSIONS, AND THE AMERICAN
R EPLY .................................................... 1490
E. THE Low POINT: EARLY AND MID 1999 ................... 1497
G. THE FINAL PUSH FOR A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH
THE UNITED STATES: FALL 1999 .......................... 1505
II. THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 15,
19 9 9 ....................................................... 15 1 1
A. CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING THE NOVEMBER 15,
1999 BILATERAL AGREEMENT ............................ 1519
B. IGNITING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN CHINA ... 1523
C. CAPITOL HILL POLITICS, REMAINING BILATERAL
AGREEMENTS AND ACCESSION AT LAST? .......... .. . ... 1528
CONCLUSION: THE DRAGON ABOUT TO ENTER ........ 1530
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CHINA CASE
STUDY
How did a country join the General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade
("GATT")? How does a country become a member of the World
Trade Organization ("WTO")? GATT Articles XXXII-XXXIII and
WTO Agreement Articles XI-XII provide the answers. To examine
these provisions in the context of China's bid to join or re-join, is
entertaining and instructive. The story itself is an epic saga, and no
country currently seeking WTO membership - Saudi Arabia, Iran,
and Russia, for example - could possibly raise a more complex array
of issues than the People's Republic of China ("PRC"). Neither the
principles nor policies, theories nor doctrines, laws nor regulations in
the domain of international trade are irrelevant to the PRC epic.
Using the PRC case study as a vehicle for examining how coun-
tries join the WTO club does not imply that the PRC is a uniquely
important applicants. Nor does it imply an endorsement of former
United States Secretary of State James Baker's statement in his April
7, 1999 Financial Times editorial that "[t]he United States has no
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bilateral relationship today more important than that with China." In
a provocative article in the September/October 1999 issue of Foreign
Affairs, Gerald Segal, the Director of Studies at the London-based
International Institute for Strategic Studies, argues persuasively that
the Middle Kingdom is a second-rank power that has mastered the
art of diplomatic theater. China is worthy of no more attention than
Brazil or India. Trotting out an array of statistics, Segal points out
that the PRC's real status in the global economy is far less important
than western political and business officials believe. For example, in
1997 the PRC accounted for a measly 3.5 percent of world GNP (the
United States was 25.6 percent), and its per capita GDP ranking was
eighty-one (roughly $773), making China fall behind Papua New
Guinea. In 1997, the PRC made up just three percent of world trade -
the same as Korea and less than Holland - and only eleven percent of
total Asian trade. (Interestingly - before the Communist "liberation"
of 1949--China's importance as a trading power peaked in 1928,
when it accounted for 2.3 percent of world trade. The PRC did not
surpass this level until 1993. In 1977, on the eve of the transition
away from a command economy, it accounted for just 0.6 percent.
The PRC currently ranks 107th on the United Nations Human De-
velopment Index, resting between Albania and Namibia. Likewise,
the PRC's military capabilities are, says Segal, vastly overstated and
it has no fearsome allies. The PRC accounts for barely 4.5 percent of
global defense spending, whereas the United States stands at 33.9
percent. Culturally, the PRC is a beacon for no one. India exerts a far
greater cultural call on non-resident Indians than does China on over-
seas Chinese, who are influenced far more by films, music, literature,
and the arts from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and even Singapore.
Segal, however, may have forgotten about the resilience and en-
trepreneurial zeal of the Chinese people, and about the vast and
unique potential of the Chinese nation. Whatever the merits of his
argument, the point of the PRC case study is that it embodies all of
the issues that could possibly arise in accession-the the proverbial
"worst case" scenario. The multilateral trading system will never
again witness such an accession saga.
A. THE ACCESSION PROCESS
Article XXVI of GATT contains provisions governing the entry
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into force of the agreement. As specified in Article XXXII, the
"contracting parties" are those countries that are original (i.e.,
founding) parties of GATT or that subsequently acceded to GATT.
Article XXVI is relevant to the original contracting parties, whereas
Article XXXIII establishes the process of accession for countries that
are not founding members. The twenty-three original contracting
parties are:
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma (Myanmar), Canada, Ceylon
(Sri Lanka), Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India,
Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paki-
stan, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Syria, South Africa, United
Kingdom, and the United States.
Article XXX: 1 of GATT states that amending GATT requires ei-
ther a two-thirds or unanimous vote of the CONTRACTING PARTIES,
depending on the provision being amended. Article XXXIII requires
a two-third majority to amend a provision. Article XII of the WTO
Agreement is little more than an echo of the GATT Article XXXIII,
which is minimalist in content. Article XXXIII allows governments
that are not a party to the GATT (or a government acting on behalf of
a separate customs territory that possesses full autonomy in its exter-
nal commercial relations) to accede to the GATT. This can only oc-
cur based on terms agreed to between the applicant government and
the CONTRACTING PARTIES. Then, the CONTRACTING PARTIES must
approve a decision in favor of accession by a two-thirds majority.
Over time, the GATT practice developed to fill in the details that
Article XXXIII does not address.
Conceptually, and in practice, accession is a two-step process.
First, the applicant must negotiate bilateral concession agreements
with each WTO member that asks for one. Collectively, the members
requesting bilateral agreements are referred to as an "accession
Working Party." The bilateral deals embody the applicant's promises
to individual members about opening its market on a government-to-
government basis. They should not be confused with previously ne-
gotiated deals that the applicant may have made with particular
members. Brand new agreements, or at the least, revisions to existing
agreements are at issue here. These new agreements are the price of
admission into the GATT-WTO system.
The need for this first step is not apparent from the language of
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GATT Article XXXIII, which, after all, speaks to the joint action of
the CONTRACTING PARTIES. Still, the process of forming bilateral
concession agreements has become indispensable. What members
will ask for such agreements? Those that have a keen export interest
in the applicant's market. Therefore, the first step can be a tedious
process. For commercially and politically significant applicants like
the PRC and Taiwan, many members are sure to request bilateral ne-
gotiations. Roughly forty WTO members asked the PRC for bilateral
concession agreements (including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
the EU, Hungary, India, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland,
and the United States), and approximately twenty-six members (in-
cluding Hong Kong and the United States) asked Taiwan for such
deals. The accession of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia are other ex-
amples demonstrating that many existing members will seek bilateral
agreements. These agreements need not be identical - indeed, it is
unlikely they will be. The members have some common, and some
different, export interests. For example, in August 1998, Taiwan
completed its bilateral agreement with the United States. Taiwan of-
fered greater market-opening concessions to American agricultural
products (specifically, beef and pork innards, and chicken) than it
agreed to in its deals with the European Union ("EU") and Japan.
The second step is the negotiation of a protocol of accession with
all WTO members, i.e., with the WTO as a whole. Technically, the
protocol is not the same thing as the decision of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES referred to in GATT Article XXXIII. The decision is taken,
and a separate protocol is drafted and approved. Thus, it could be
said that accession actually involves three steps: bilateral concession
agreements, the decision, and the protocol.
Obviously, the member states will not agree upon a protocol un-
less the first step is accomplished. When the demands of several
members for bilateral concession agreements remain unsatisfied,
those members will not support accession. To be sure, if only a few
members remain unsatisfied, then they could invoke the non-
application provisions of the GATT and WTO Agreements. At the
same time, successful completion of the first step does not guarantee
an easy negotiation for protocol of accession. To make matters even
more complicated, the two steps may overlap.
The protocol represents the terms of entry into the WTO. It is, in
2000] 1473
1474 AM. U. INT'L L. REK [15:1469
effect, a contract between the acceding party and the members in
their joint capacity (the CONTRACTING PARTIES, in the language of
GATT Article XXXIII). By implication, the members in their joint
capacity are a separate legal entity under international law. Many of
the arrangements made in the bilateral concession agreements be-
come multilateral through the protocol. In fact, the bilateral agree-
ments are incorporated into a schedule of commitments that is sent
with the protocol, along with a report from the Working Party, to the
WTO General Council for approval.
In addition, the protocol outlines the applicant's current trade laws
and policies, while noting the differences between that regime and
the minimum GATT-WTO requirements. The protocol explains how
- and when - the applicant intends to correct these differences. Thus,
for example, there might be a gap between the applicant's sanitary
rules and the SPS Agreement, or its copyright laws and the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") Agree-
ment. The protocol identifies these problem areas and sets out the
agreed plan of action for addressing them.
Finally, some applicants may want the protocol to indicate their
status as a developing - or least developed - country so as to take ad-
vantage of the special and differential ("S & D") treatment afforded
by many Uruguay Round agreements for such countries. The PRC,
for example, argued vociferously for developing country status.
Many WTO members may see this as a ruse to avoid trade obliga-
tions for as long as possible. Indeed, as intimated, aside from the
problem of status, the question of "when?" often is crucial. Appli-
cants may want to defer the reduction and elimination of tariff and
non-tariff barriers for as long as possible. Extant members are sure to
pursue the opposite goal in the protocol negotiations.
A sense of urgency often pervades these negotiations, particularly
on the part of the applicant. The longer the negotiations drag on, the
more likely the terms of entry will become more onerous. This is be-
cause the WTO members will agree among themselves to new trade
liberalizing initiatives. For example, suppose a new trade negotiating
round commences and results in a major market-opening deal on ag-
riculture. A country that acceded before the new round had the op-
portunity to shape the terms of the deal, and in particular, the oppor-
tunity to make sure it can live with the terms. A country seeking
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accession after the round will be stuck with a deal negotiated by oth-
ers. Moreover, to use a track-and-field metaphor, "the bar will get
raised." Many of the pre-round concessions the applicant made in
bilateral negotiations during the first step of the accession process
may, after the round, be deemed inadequate. After all, if the new
round leads to greater liberalization among the members, then more
will be expected of the applicant.
In the PRC's case, the sense of urgency spilled over to Taiwan.
Taiwan was concerned that if it was not a WTO member by the time
the planned Millennium Round was supposed to have commenced
(early 2000), then the concessions it made in its bilateral agreements
would be deemed inadequate by the WTO members. Taiwan feared
it would have no choice but to liberalize more quickly and risk the
shock that import surges would inflict on its economy. Taiwan con-
sidered the possibility of backing away from its "down payment"
market access measures made to the United States if it did not gain
WTO membership in the near future. After all, why implement these
measures on the assumption of imminent accession if that event was
far off? There was the "rub." Politically, Taiwan could not become a
WTO member before the PRC. Thus, somewhat ironically, Taiwan
was quite eager to see the PRC accede.
This irony suggests that despite the difficulties and complexities,
negotiations on bilateral agreements and the protocol ought not be
analogized to a war or even a non-violent zero-sum game. With re-
spect to most if not all applicants, there is a shared interest among the
applicant and the WTO members that the applicant accede. That
shared interest may spill over to other applicants waiting in the
queue, as in the PRC-Taiwan case. As long as an applicant remains
outside the WTO, it bears no multilateral trade obligations. The ap-
plicant is responsible for performing only those requirements it has
previously taken on through regional or bilateral trade and invest-
ment treaties. Likewise, WTO members bear no multilateral obliga-
tions to the applicant, and are liable only for the obligations they
have previously assumed through a direct deal with the applicant. By
joining the WTO, trade relations between the applicant and WTO
members stabilize in a legal sense. Each side takes on clear, predict-
able multilateral obligations towards the other that are almost certain
to be far more rigorous, in terms of demanding trade liberalization,
than any previous bilateral arrangements. Moreover, the WTO has a
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dispute resolution mechanism to adjudicate alleged breaches. In
brief, the two steps ought to be thought of as a positive-sum game.
The benefits of this game extend beyond trade relations. An oft-
made (and quite plausible) argument is that the PRC would be a bet-
ter neighbor in Asia - and a more responsible world citizen - if it
were welcomed into the WTO. To delay accession unnecessarily
could isolate the PRC. It would punish the PRC's burgeoning middle
class, the very people most likely to embrace democracy. Then, the
PRC might turn inward, its human rights record might worsen, and
its hand in Tibet might become all the heavier. Without accession,
the PRC might also become increasingly hostile to the outside world,
more inclined to settle matters - like the possible reunification of
Taiwan, problems in Hong Kong, or the dispute over the Spratly Is-
lands with several Asian countries - militarily.
A final point about the GATT-WTO accession process is worth
mentioning. GATT Article XXVI:5(c) establishes a different proce-
dure for accession for customs territories that have full autonomy in
the conduct of external commercial relations. An existing contracting
party responsible for the territory can sponsor it for membership. In
1950, Indonesia, sponsored by its former colonial master, the Neth-
erlands, became the first country admitted under this provision.
Starting in 1957 and for several years thereafter, several former
colonies - Cambodia, Ghana, Laos, Malaysia, and Tunisia, for exam-
ple - entered into GATT through the sponsorship procedure.
In contrast to Article XXXIII, the Article XXVI:5(c) procedure
does not require a series of bilateral concession agreements, decision
of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, or protocol of accession. Rather, the
customs territory or newly independent country obtains membership
on the same terms and conditions as those that had been accepted by
its former colonial master on its behalf. For example, if the Dutch
agreed to bind the tariff on imports of wheat into Indonesia at twelve
percent, then Indonesia would have a tariff schedule with a twelve
percent bound rate for wheat. Significantly, Indonesia would not in-
herit a concession on wheat if the Dutch had not made any. As an-
other example, if the sponsoring contracting party elected to not ap-
ply GATT obligations to another party, then the sponsored entity
would be deemed to have elected non-application to the same entity.
(This occurred with former British colonies sponsored by the United
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Kingdom. The British had avoided application of GATT to Japan
when Japan acceded, and the colonies followed suit).
Under GATT Article XXVI:5(c) and procedures adopted during a
1957 GATT meeting, there is a period of de ficto application of
GATT obligations on a reciprocal basis between the contracting par-
ties and the customs territory or newly independent country. During
that period, the new country can adjust to the obligations, implement
necessary trade policies, and decide whether it desires full GATT
membership. An affirmative decision leads to full membership after
a prescribed reasonable (though sometimes prolonged) period.
Does the sponsorship procedure have any relevance to the PRC?
Obviously not, because its colonial history pre-dates GATT. Even if
it did not, whether the PRC had the requisite autonomy in the con-
duct of its external commercial relations as required by GATT Arti-
cle XXVI:5(c), under the spheres of influence of the imperial powers
is dubious. However, at least in theory, the procedure could be rele-
vant to Taiwan. If re-unification occurred and the PRC treated Tai-
wan as a separate customs territory, then the PRC could sponsor
Taiwan. In practice however, the WTO members would likely object
to applying the terms and conditions of the PRC's membership to
Taiwan. They would argue that Taiwan, as a developed country,
ought not receive any of the preferential treatment allowed to the
PRC. Further, Taiwan undoubtedly would have its own objections to
PRC sponsorship.
B. EARLY HISTORY: THE CURIOUS WITHDRAWAL
As indicated above, Cuba was an original GATT contracting
party. After the communist revolution of 1959 led by Fidel Castro, it
remains so, and was also a founding WTO member. China's story,
however, is very different. The former Republic of China was an
original GATT contracting party, but later internal political upheaval
led to its withdrawal. On October 1, 1949, the PRC was founded, and
the tattered remains of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government
fled to Taiwan. On March 6, 1950, the U.N. Secretary General re-
ceived a communication from officials in Taiwan indicating that
"China" was withdrawing from GATT. The withdrawal took effect
on May 5, 1950.
The Mainland Communist government did not recognize the Na-
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tionalists' action, and contested the validity of this withdrawal. It ar-
gued that the withdrawal was null and void because it was attempted
when the Communists controlled the mainland, hence Chiang
Kai-shek's government did not have the right to represent China. Put
in public international law terms, the PRC argued for application of
the law of succession - it should be recognized as the legitimate suc-
cessor government in China. In rebuttal, however, it can be said that
the "China" that was an original contracting party and the "China"
that withdrew was the Republic of China, headed by Chiang's Na-
tionalists. The Communist government on the mainland represented
a different sovereign entity; a China that had never been a part of
GATT. In other words, the PRC was not a successor government to
the Nationalist one, but an entirely new creature. Plainly, the argu-
ments involve politically charged questions of recognition, and
whether there is one China or two. Whatever the merits of the con-
flicting positions, the fact is that for the twenty years following the
withdrawal, the PRC played virtually no role in GATT affairs. Mao
Zedong simply did not much care about them.
In January 1965, the CONTRACTING PARTIES granted Taiwan's re-
quest to join GATT as a non-voting observer. In 1971 the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly voted to restore all the rights of China in the U.N. to
the PRC. Accordingly, the PRC became a full member of the Gen-
eral Assembly and permanent member of the Security Council. Ad-
ditionally, the PRC obtained representation in specialized U.N. agen-
cies. While GATT was not such an agency (nor is the WTO), GATT
followed U.N. policy decisions. In seating the PRC delegation, the
U.N. decided the PRC was the sole legitimate government of China.
Hence, GATT revoked Taiwan's observer status. Curiously, the PRC
elected not to seek membership in GATT in 1971 - an otherwise aus-
picious year for the PRC's international status. The reasons for this
decision may lie in the internal upheaval in the PRC associated with
the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76, the preoccupation of PRC lead-
ers with President Nixon's dramatic "opening" to China, or perhaps
even Mao's declining health.
C. THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD MEMBERSHIP
However, in August 1980 - coinciding with the post-Mao liberali-
zation period - the PRC sent a delegation to the GATT Secretariat in
Geneva and applied for participation as a non-voting observer. The
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CONTRACTING PARTIES granted the request in 1982 and the PRC be-
gan to participate regularly as an observer in meetings, including the
Uruguay Round negotiations. On December 15, 1983, the PRC
signed the Multi-Fibre Agreement ("MFA"), which took effect on
January 18, 1984. The MFA became the major legal instrument for
regulating international trade in textiles through a complex quota
system.
The year 1986 was a watershed in the PRC's efforts to join GATT.
In January, then-Director General of GATT, Arthur Dunkel, visited
the PRC. On April 23, in accordance with the 1984 Sino-British Joint
Declaration on the future of Hong Kong (plus an agreement reached
in March on this subject), Her Majesty's government sent a note to
the GATT Secretariat concerning the status of Hong Kong. The
United Kingdom proclaimed that Hong Kong was a contracting party
pursuant to Article XXVI:5(c) of GATT. That provision allows a
customs territory (e.g., Hong Kong) of a contracting party (e.g., the
United Kingdom) to itself be deemed a contracting party when the
territory gains independence in the conduct of its external commer-
cial relations. Simultaneously, the PRC sent a note to the GATT Sec-
retariat indicating that it would resume sovereign control over Hong
Kong on July 1, 1997, and would establish the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region ("SAR"). The Hong Kong SAR would con-
tinue as a contracting party under the title "Hong Kong, China."'
Most importantly, on July 10, 1986, the PRC requested that its status
as a contracting party to GATT be restored.
The PRC wanted to join GATT and become a WTO member out
of rational economic self-interest. Entry would mean lower tariffs for
Chinese goods by virtue of the Most Favored Nation ("MFN") status
and tariff binding principles of Articles I and II of GATT. For exam-
ple, in 1994 the PRC produced one-seventh of the world's clothing
and shoes. Until entry, these products faced tariffs as high as twenty-
three percent in the EU and forty-nine percent in Australia. Member-
ship would mean the average duty imposed by developed countries
on Chinese clothes and shoes would drop to 4.8 percent. As another
1. The Macao SAR benefits from a similar arrangement, worked out between
the Portuguese and PRC governments in 1991. On December 20, 1999, China re-
sumed sovereign control over Macao, which continued to be a contracting party
under the name "Macao, China."
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example, in 1994 half of all Chinese products entering the United
States faced Non Tariff Barriers ("NTBs"), mainly quotas. If the
PRC became a member, these barriers would no longer apply. Over-
all, in 1994 the World Bank estimated that China's greater access to
foreign markets as a result of accession to GATT and membership in
the WTO would lead to a thirty-eight percent increase in PRC ex-
ports.
The PRC understood that entry also meant political benefits. Not
only would the PRC become entitled to MFN treatment from the
United States (as well as all other WTO Members), but it would es-
cape the embarrassing annual reviews of such treatment under the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment. To be sure, Congressional action to
modify the Amendment would be necessary to remove the PRC from
coverage of its terms and assure permanent MFN status. Still, it
seems reasonable to believe that if the United States were willing to
support accession, which would mean incurring the GATT Article I
MFN obligation, then it would take the legislative steps necessary to
end the annual MFN review process.
Fundamentally, to put the matter in blunt Asian terms, entry would
give great "face" to the PRC. It would signify that the PRC is no
longer a second-class country, but rather an accepted equal partner in
the international economic community. The PRC is also quick to
point out that its accession would mean great "face" for the WTO:
the WTO hardly is worthy of its name-World Trade Organiza-
tion-until the world's most populous country joined its ranks.
The PRC's enthusiasm for rejoining GATT and obtaining WTO
membership was not universally shared. As Douglas Newkirk, a
former Assistant United States Trade Representative, commented,
"[t]he GATT wasn't written with a socialist market economy in
mind." The PRC's transition from a communist to a market econ-
omy, and the often-repeated, oxymoronic declaration by its elder
leaders that it has a "socialist market economy," complicated the en-
try process. The PRC has no choice but to assume certain obligations
and make specific commitments in order to become part of the
GATT-WTO regime. These burdens were the subject of intense,
heated negotiations conducted under the auspices of the GATT-WTO
since 1987.
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D. THE FAILED EFFORT TO BECOME A FOUNDING WTO MEMBER
To consider the PRC's application for entry, GATT established a
"Working Party on China's Status as a Contracting Party" in March
1987.2 Subsequently, the PRC imposed a unilateral deadline of Janu-
ary 1, 1995, for re-entry. This was also the date the WTO was for-
mally established, because the PRC wanted desperately to be a
founding member of that institution. Here, "face" was more impor-
tant than political realities or legal technicalities. For the most part,
the same benefits and burdens established under GATT and the Uru-
guay Round agreements accrue to a country whether it is a founding
member or joins later - from a legal perspective, there is no rush.
The PRC's deadline proved a rather clumsy and ineffectual effort
to pressure the international trade community. From 1987-95, the
Working Party met over twenty times to consider the terms of a pro-
tocol under which the PRC would accede to GATT and become a
founding WTO member. Among the issues discussed were: 1) the
PRC's tariff barriers (which at the time averaged thirty-five percent,
far in excess of those of contracting parties), 2) NTBs such as the
lack of transparency and uniformity of the PRC's customs require-
ments and other trade laws; 3) market access for foreign financial
services; 4) government subsidies to state-owned enterprises; 5) the
convertibility of PRC currency - the yuan (or renminbi); 6) Chinese
labor standards; and 7) enforcement of Chinese intellectual property
laws.
An exceptionally difficult issue for the Working Party was
whether the PRC would gain admission as a developing or developed
country. For many purposes, developing countries are accorded S &
D treatment under GATT and the Multilateral Agreements on Trade
in Goods. For example, the Working Party may suspend certain obli-
gations in order to pursue pressing economic development interests,
or they may phase them in over a longer period of time than applies
to developed countries. In addition, developing countries are entitled
to the benefits of the General System of Preferences ("GSP"). The
PRC was anxious to secure these advantages. However, the United
States, under strong pressure from American businesses, insisted that
2. In December 1995, following the birth of the WTO, it was renamed the
"WTO Working Party on the Accession of China."
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China join the WTO as a developed country. No other member of the
Working Party was prepared to grant the PRC all the exemptions
permissible under the GATT-WTO regime for developing countries -
with the exception of the EU, which indicated in 1994 that it might
support the PRC's accession on the basis of less stringent require-
ments than those advocated by the United States.
This appearance was a harbinger of real division among the United
States, EU, and Japan over the terms of Chinese accession. The
United States wanted the PRC to meet all the criteria necessary for
accession at the time it entered the WTO, and sought a unified front
in advancing this position. In contrast, the EU and Japan were will-
ing to settle for the PRC fulfilling some requirements upon entry, and
committing to meet other goals after a post-accession transition pe-
riod. In effect, the Europeans and Japanese were playing the role of
"good cop," thereby casting the Americans in the role of "bad cop"
and forcing the United States to do the "heavy lifting" in the nego-
tiations. The United States feared division in the ranks would facili-
tate the PRC's preferred strategy of handling countries individually
and playing one off against another to gain advantage.
The United States also raise a related concern, about the PRC's
State Owned Enterprises ("SOEs"). The PRC claimed many of the
SOEs operate according to market principles. The United States
countered that state ownership confers control and direction that was
inconsistent with a free market economy, and that government agen-
cies and SOEs controlled seventy-five percent of the Chinese econ-
omy. The United States also noted the PRC's refusal to agree to
publish quotas on state-traded agricultural products. Yet, the PRC
could not be expected to shut down its SOEs overnight. Millions of
workers would lose their jobs, possibly resulting in social disruption,
even anarchy, on a scale that would make the problems at Tiananmen
Square in 1989 seem mild by comparison. The PRC insisted that it,
and not the United States, would decide the timetable, according to
its own economic development needs and political context.
The PRC had good reason for concern. In February 2000 - shortly
after the United States and the PRC signed their bilateral agreement -
over 20,000 workers at the Yangjiazhangzi Mine (about 250 miles
northeast of Beijing) and their families rioted, burning cars, barri-
cading streets, smashing windows, setting fires, and fighting the
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People's Armed Police. (Yangjiazhangzi was the largest non-ferrous
mine in the PRC, once supplying thirty-five percent of China's out-
put. It produced molybdenum, which is used to make airplanes,
rockets, and X-rays, because it can withstand high temperatures.)
The People's Liberation Army was only able to restore order by fir-
ing shots above the crowd.
The protest was a reaction to the Communist Party's announce-
ment that, as part of the effort to accelerate the closure of inefficient
SOE's in anticipation of WTO accession, it was closing the mine.
The Party declared a one-time severance package for each miner of
560 renminbi, about $68 for each year worked at the mine, and that
miners would have to pay for their own social security and health in-
surance. Even in China's impoverished northeastern "rust belt," the
$68 figure was paltry. A family of three could live on $68 at a mea-
ger level for about a month.
Given that the PRC would have to close thousands of SOEs-not
just mines, but also cement factories, steel mills, textile factories, and
the like-Yangjiazhanzi was a frightening symbol of what was to
come. Where would the central government get the money to supply
pension and welfare services for redundant workers? How could tax
revenues cover the financing burden, when the entities being taxed
were losing money? How could the central government shift the bur-
den to local taxing authorities, who did not want the pressure of im-
posing ever-higher fees on local businesses? And, of course, how
could they maintain law and order amidst the transition?
Still another troublesome issue concerned Taiwan's application for
membership in the GATT-WTO regime, submitted on January 1,
1990. Taiwan - which boasts one of the world's largest economies
and is one of the top fifteen trading powers - pledged to join as a de-
veloped country. In September 1992, the GATT established a formal
Working Party to handle the application.
Acting in accordance with its policy favoring the reunification of
the PRC and Taiwan, and the maintenance thereafter of Deng Xia-
oping's "one country, two systems" policy, the PRC demanded that
the Contracting Parties withhold approval of Taiwan's application
until its own application was accepted. Perhaps as an ineluctable
pragmatic accommodation, Taiwan agreed it should not become a
GATT contracting party (or WTO Member) before the PRC - the
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famous "no earlier" arrangement. The arrangement had policy logic
to it. If China was one country but two systems, then Taiwan could
join only as a separate customs territory of China (like Hong Kong,
not as a sovereign nation), which presumed that China already was in
the club. The Chairman of the GATT Council negotiated a deal in
1990 underscoring this arrangement. The Council would examine the
reports of the Working Parties on the accession of the PRC and Tai-
wan independently, but it would consider and adopt the PRC's mate-
rials first.
That is not to say Taiwan opposed the PRC's application. To the
contrary, Taiwanese officials tended to view accession of both Tai-
wan and the PRC as a device to reduce tensions between them. (The
PRC, of course, regards Taiwan as a "renegade province" and has
not foresworn forceful reunification). How so? Liberalization of
trade barriers through accession should boost economic ties. By
September 1999, over 40,000 Taiwanese companies had invested in
the PRC. Taiwanese officials predicted this Taiwanese Foreign direct
Investment ("FDI") would lead the PRC to import more from Taiwan
- if the PRC's import barriers were reduced.
Interestingly, the virtual certainty of the PRC acceding before
Taiwan raised the prospect that the PRC could demand a bilateral
concession agreement with Taiwan as a precursor to Taiwan's own
entry. That would give great "face" to Taiwan, essentially elevating
it to an independent state like its archrival. To avoid this possibility,
it was suggested in February 2000, that any protocol of accession for
the PRC not take effect until after thirty days. During that month,
Taiwan could be offered a protocol. That way, Taiwan would join
the WTO "after" the PRC, but before the PRC had become a member
empowered to call for a bilateral deal.
In any event, given all the difficulties, the PRC's deadline for en-
try proved impossible to meet. In the Working Party, the United
States and EU on the one hand, and the PRC on the other hand, bit-
terly disagreed over the PRC's offers to liberalize its laws governing
international trade. The Americans and Europeans argued the Chi-
nese proposals regarding its protocol for accession did not suffi-
ciently liberalize market access to foreign goods and services. For
example, the PRC was unwilling to change certain laws that favored
Chinese over foreign firms, a violation of the national treatment
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principle.
United States-Sino bilateral trade relations had an important effect
on the PRC's application to become a founding WTO member. In
October 1991, the United States Trade Representative ("USTR") ini-
tiated an investigation into Chinese market barriers under Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended ("1974 Act"). These barri-
ers included failure to publish trade-related laws, regulations, judicial
decisions, and administrative rulings, NTBs such as import licensing
requirements and quantitative restrictions, and restrictive product
standards, testing, and certification requirements. After one year of
negotiation, the United States and PRC resolved the investigation by
signing a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU"). Pursu-
ant to the MOU, the PRC agreed to eliminate certain market access
barriers over a five-year period. In return, the United States agreed to
liberalize certain export controls on goods for the PRC, and support
the PRC's goal of becoming a WTO member.
On April 16, 1994, the PRC signed the Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round and the WTO Agreement. Nonethe-
less, from the American perspective, the PRC's implementation of its
commitments set forth in the 1992 MOU was a key indicator of its
readiness to undertake GATT-WTO obligations. By October 1994,
the USTR still had numerous concerns about the PRC's international
trade law regime. Here are some examples:
* Transparency. The PRC's trade laws and regulations lacked
transparency. For example, some quotas were not published. The
PRC needed to guarantee that only published rules would be en-
forced.
* Tariffs. In various sectors, the timetable for reducing tariffs,
including the number and level of tariff peaks, was either unspecified
or too long. The problem was acute in certain industries that re-
mained protected by extraordinarily high tariffs. For instance, duties
on imported autos ranged between eighty to 100 percent.
* NTBs. The PRC needed to eliminate non-tariff measures, such
as quotas, not permitted under GATT 1994, within an acceptable pe-
riod.
0 Subsidies. The PRC needed to phase out industrial subsidies
prohibited by the Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement"). Given the extent of
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SOEs in the PRC, this point was particularly acute. The GATT-WTO
regime is designed for market economies. GATT says very little
concerning SOEs. Yet, much of the Chinese economy remained (di-
rectly or indirectly) in state hands, and the state subsidized its eco-
nomic agents in many ways. For example, it arranged for cheap loans
from Chinese banks.
* Trading rights. The PRC needed to expand trading rights for
foreign companies by allowing them to import and export without a
license. The PRC also needed to eliminate its designated trade rules,
i.e., rules limiting the trading rights of certain firms to trade in a lim-
ited array of specified products.
* Uniformity and the rule of law. Trade rules often varied hap-
hazardly from one Chinese province to the next. The PRC needed to
provide assurances it could apply GATT-WTO obligations uniformly
across regions and provinces. More fundamentally, it needed to up-
grade its rudimentary legal system to ensure the rule of law was ob-
served throughout the country. All too often, decisions were made on
the basis of guanxi (personal relationships and connections).
* National Treatment. The PRC needed to extend national
treatment to imported goods and to foreign companies operating in
the PRC, particularly in the services industry.
• Pricing. The PRC needed to phase out state-fixed prices, and
thus allow market forces to determine prices. This concern was a
clear manifestation of the challenge the PRC faced in moving toward
a full market economy.
0 Intellectual Property Rights. The PRC needed to provide
meaningful protection for patents, copyrights, trademarks, and semi-
conductor mask works by enacting and enforcing appropriate legis-
lation.
a Safeguards. The United States and other WTO Members
would need a special safeguards clause, in addition to GATT Article
XIX, to protect their industries against sudden surges of Chinese ex-
ports that were anticipated once they lowered trade barriers to Chi-
nese goods upon accession. In other words, the United States and
other WTO Members feared their usual defenses against cheap
manufactured imports would be overwhelmed, so they demanded a
trade remedy tailored for use against the anticipated increased com-
petition from the PRC.
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* Agriculture. The PRC needed to reduce non-tariff measures on
agricultural products so foreign products could enjoy greater market
access. For example, quality inspections were often tougher for im-
ports than for domestic products.
0 Foreign exchange. The PRC needed to allow the yuan to be
freely convertible. This concern was another manifestation of the
problem of moving toward a full market economy.
The USTR linked the PRC's request for developing country ex-
emptions with appropriate commitments from the PRC on the above
issues.
E. ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS IN 1996-98: THE AMERICAN
POSITION
During the mid and late 1990s, the United States repeated its bot-
tom line position on Chinese accession so often it became a mantra:
it supported the PRC's application, but entry must be on "commer-
cially meaningful terms." Most of the USTR's concerns as of Octo-
ber 1994 (listed above) remained sticking points in the late 1990s.
During 1996-98, additional points of dispute flared:
* Prison and Child Labor. The PRC needed to make progress
toward the elimination of exports of products made with prison or
child labor.
* Trading rights. The PRC seemed willing to grant increased
trading rights to foreign companies, i.e., the right to import and ex-
port products, particularly the right to do so without going through a
Chinese middleman, but they still wanted to maintain several prob-
lematic restrictions.
* Distribution rights. The PRC had not agreed to grant distribu-
tion rights - such as wholesaling, retailing, maintenance and repair,
and transportation - to foreign companies. In other words, foreign
companies could not own and operate distribution networks within
the PRC. These networks were controlled by state-run Chinese com-
panies. A foreign firm could not conduct marketing, after-sales
service, maintenance and repair, and customer support unless its
business license from the government allowed it to do so. Yet, distri-
bution was a service and, pursuant to the General Agreement on
Trade in Services ("GATS"), was a legitimate subject for negotia-
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tion. While the PRC had guaranteed foreign companies would have
equal access, along with domestic firms, to distribution and trans-
portation networks, the PRC needed to grant foreign companies the
opportunity to set up and control these networks so they could get
their wares to market. American companies like Amway, Avon, and
Mary Kay Cosmetics, which relied on direct selling, were examples
of foreign firms whose access was limited by the PRC's strictures.
o After-sales servicing. The PRC needed to scrap its rule that
foreign manufacturers provide after-sales service through a domestic
Chinese company. This rule added unnecessary costs, and adversely
affected the ability of foreigners to provide service and control in-
ventory.
o Foreign Direct Investment: No foreign company could invest
in the PRC without a Joint Venture ("JV") partner. In many in-
stances, the foreign partner was limited to a minority stake. Moreo-
ver, the PRC often imposed performance requirements as a condition
of approving an Foreign Direct Investment ("FDI") project. For ex-
ample, it would condition permission on technology transfer, export
requirements, local content usage and other offset arrangements, or
foreign exchange balancing. The PRC needed to eliminate these re-
strictions and allow for freedom of FDI.
* Financial services. While the PRC had given licenses to a
lucky few foreign commercial banks to conduct business in local cur-
rency, and then only in Shanghai and Shenzhen, most banks were
barred from these activities. Even those lucky few were limited to
taking deposits and making loans in local currency to foreign-
invested companies. The PRC needed to allow foreign banks to
compete on equal footing with Chinese banks in these lines of busi-
ness, specifically by accepting deposits from, and lending to, Chinese
business and individual customers.
* Telecommunications. The PRC was willing to permit just two
telecom JVs in two cities, and limiting the foreign partner to a 25
percent equity stake. This sort of experimental liberalization was in-
sufficient. Indeed, aside from this experiment, the PRC banned all
FDI in the telecom sector. Moreover, the PRC placed significant
geographic restrictions on the provision of paging, value added,
closed user group, mobile and cellular, and domestic wireline serv-
ices.
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o Agriculture. Fresh agriculture disputes had arisen between the
United States and the PRC. The PRC allegedly used Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Standards ("SPS") restrictions to keep out American
agricultural products like citrus, meat, stone fruit, and wheat, with no
scientific justification for doing so.
o Textiles. The PRC allegedly circumvented American textile
import quotas by illegally trans-shipping billions of dollars worth of
textiles, resulting in the loss of tens of thousands of American jobs.
Moreover, the PRC wanted to protect its textile industry for several
years after it entered the WTO.
Thus, the United States, joined by the EU, rejected proposals in
1996 by some Asian political and business leaders calling for the
PRC to be a conditional WTO Member. Their idea was that condi-
tional membership would be a grace period for the PRC to improve
its commitment offers, and take on some of the obligations of WTO
membership.
The United States continued to reject the PRC's position that it be
treated as a developing country. The United States said the sheer size
of the PRC as a global trader dictated that it enter the WTO without
S & D treatment. In 1996, the EU offered a compromise: the PRC
would make a "down payment" by agreeing to some obligations im-
mediately upon accession, and would phase in the remaining obliga-
tions over a period of years agreed to by the negotiating Members
and the PRC. The result would be that the "breathing space" would
be a negotiated matter, not mandated by the Uruguay Round agree-
ments, because the WTO would not consider it a developing country.
In December 1996, the PRC accepted a variant of this compromise: it
dropped its demand for comprehensive developing country status,
and agreed to negotiate transition periods only for industrial sectors
genuinely in need of S & D treatment owing to serious adjustment
difficulties.
The United States articulated its position to the Chinese before and
during President Jiang Zemin's state visit in October 1997. The frank
exchanges produced no tangible results - other than increasing mis-
trust and hard feelings. Nowhere was the phenomenon of the two
sides talking past one another more apparent than in a White House
press conference held jointly by Presidents Clinton and Jiang. Asked
about the meaning of the Tiananmen Square incident, President
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Clinton spoke eloquently of the American belief that a country is
made stronger through pluralism and the free interchange of ideas.
President Jiang was impressive in his defense of the traditional Asian
view of the essentiality of order and stability for progress. President
Clinton countered that the PRC's theories of political economy were
on the wrong side of history. WTO accession seemed further away
than ever. The two sides had not yet even moved beyond Tiananmen,
and could agree only to disagree on how to read that history. About
the only positive trade outcome from the summit was the PRC's an-
nouncement that it would join the separate Information Technology
Agreement ("ITA"), signed in March 1997.
The prospects for WTO accession dampened further. First, Amer-
ica's bilateral trade deficit with the PRC yawned. (Indeed, in January
1999, the PRC became America's largest source of trade imbalance,
overtaking Japan.) Beijing argued that American customs statistics
distorted the true picture, because re-exports from the PRC through
Hong Kong were included. That argument, however, became unper-
suasive when the PRC resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong on July
1, 1997. The better argument-that many exports from the PRC were
from American Multinational Corporations ("MNCs") operating
there-fell on deaf ears. Second, and of far greater political impor-
tance, in late 1997 and into 1998, the Clinton Administration was
rocked by charges that the Democratic Party had accepted illegal
campaign contributions from the PRC during past campaigns, raising
serious questions about Chinese influence over the outcome of an
American presidential election.
F. ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS IN 1996-98: THE DEBATE IN TI-E
PRC, CHINESE CONCESSIONS, AND THE AMERICAN REPLY
At times during 1996-98, signals emanated from Beijing suggest-
ing the PRC was losing interest in WTO membership. Economic
problems associated with domestic reform and effects of the Asian
economic crisis plagued the PRC. Reformers in the government - in-
cluding the pro-accession Ministry of Trade and Economic Coopera-
tion ("MOFTEC") - clashed with powerful domestic interests over
the nature and speed of change in this perilous environment. The
People's Liberation Army feared losing control over telecommuni-
cations to foreign companies, SOEs - including banks and insurance
companies - and their guardian ministries feared losing market share
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to foreign companies, farmers feared they could not compete with
foreign agri-business. For ailing SOEs, even a generous transition
period would be a suspended death sentence. Reformers also were
under siege from officials who argued the tariff reduction and other
market-opening concessions that would be necessary for entry would
be too painful for private-sector, infant Chinese industries to bear.
These officials pointed out the PRC already enjoyed bilateral trade
relations with nearly 200 countries (and large surpluses with many of
them), most or all of which included MFN treatment, so what value
added could there be from WTO membership? In fact, in addition to
the market-opening concessions it would have to make, maybe the
PRC would be made worse off by the Uruguay Round Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
("Dispute Settlement Understanding", or "DSU"). After all, resolv-
ing disputes bilaterally put the PRC in an advantageous position be-
cause of its size: it could be a bully if it so chose. The DSU put all
WTO Members on a level dispute resolution field.
To be sure, some of the reluctance to meet stiff conditions for
WTO entry was rooted in the privileged status a few officials en-
joyed and used corruptly to enrich themselves. Graft and smuggling
were not uncommon among many (especially mid and lower level)
functionaries. There was, however, more than personal gain at stake.
Consider the American demand that foreign banks be allowed to deal
in yuan and take deposits from local customers, along with its de-
mand for an end to state subsidization of SOEs. SOEs employed
more than two-thirds of all urban workers (i.e., more than 150 mil-
lion people), and provided them with all of their health and social
benefits. If both demands were met, a monstrous crisis faced the
Chinese economy. Bad loans made over the years to SOEs enfeebled
Chinese banks. SOEs absorbed about eighty-five percent of bank
loans in the PRC, but produced less than one-third of the PRC's out-
put. Yet, the weak Chinese banks would be subject to unbearable
competition from foreign banks. The SOEs themselves would lose
their subsidies, and also be subject to foreign competition in their re-
spective sectors as per market access commitments. Therefore, the
SOEs would be even worse off than before, and repayment of their
loans to Chinese banks would be severely imperiled. In turn, Chinese
banks would collapse under the dual weight of non-performing loans
and foreign competition from the likes of Citibank and other well-
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capitalized behemoths. The Chinese populace would panic: there
would be runs on the banks, and ultimately, civil unrest.
No responsible government of the PRC could let this scenario
materialize. Better to "go slow" on trade liberalizing commitments,
even if that meant deferring WTO membership, until the Asian eco-
nomic crisis had passed and the salubrious effects of reforms initially
unleashed by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s had put the economy
in a strong position to withstand foreign competition. Indeed, the
Chinese insisted on promoting so-called "pillar" industries: cars,
construction, electronics, machinery, and petrochemicals. These in-
dustries would be the principal muscles of the Chinese economic gi-
ant of the new millennium. They needed protection until they were
sufficiently well developed. For instance, the Chinese said they did
not want to import any foreign-made cars for up to fifteen years after
WTO accession. Any wholly-owned domestic car companies, along
with Western and Japanese car companies with Joint Ventures in the
PRC, thus would be safe from competition from imports. To the
United States, the Chinese approach to its pillar industries smacked
of industrial policy - marshaling domestic resources to build tip fa-
vored industries, and keeping out foreign competition in the mean-
time. The Americans found it fundamentally at odds with the PRC's
supposed goal of moving to a full market economy, and inconsistent
with the free-market principles underlying the GATT-WTO regime.
In addition to rigid concerns about the pace of domestic economic
liberalization and market opening, some Chinese officials openly es-
poused nationalistic arguments against bending to America's intran-
sigent demands on the terms of WTO accession. The Americans
were treating the PRC not as a strategic partner, but as a competitor,
even a threat to be contained. In December 1996, Wu Jiahuang, the
Director-General of the Tariffs Department of the General Admini-
stration of Customs, said the PRC had become "indifferent and
doesn't care anymore" about WTO accession because of "excessive
demands." He dubbed the entry bid a "sunken boat."
Was there a kernel of truth in the nationalistic position? Along
with the EU, the United States was demanding heavier concessions
from the PRC as the price of WTO admission than had been required
of most poor countries. For instance, both the United States and the
EU asked the PRC to reduce its tariffs below those in many Less De-
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veloped Countries ("LDCs"). Services were another example. The
PRC was supposed to roll back barriers to foreign banks, securities
firms, insurers, and telecommunications providers to a far greater
degree than many LDCs. Still another example was the insistence on
safeguards in addition to GATT Article XIX. Any additional safe-
guard mechanism aimed particularly at Chinese import surges would
be blatantly discriminatory, and obviously would reduce the value of
the GATT Article : 1 obligation of existing Members to the PRC af-
ter it joined.
Still, the pro-accession forces in the Chinese government main-
tained the upper hand. They admitted some Chinese industries would
suffer from increased import competition. They argued, however,
that the advantages of membership would outweigh the disadvan-
tages. It was a delectable neo-classical economic argument, cast in
Chinese terms of course: trade liberalization would result in a net
gain to society, and perhaps the winners could compensate the losers.
Thus, during 1996-97, the "internationalists" in Beijing were able to
offer a number of concessions on issues of concern to Washington.
For example:
• Standstill. The PRC would not enact any new laws, or imple-
ment any new policies that were inconsistent with WTO principles.
In other words, the PRC would not replace market-opening measures
with new barriers.
* Tariffs. The PRC re-affirmed a commitment it had made ini-
tially in 1995 to decrease its average un-weighted tariffs on non-
agricultural products to fifteen percent by the year 2000 (seventeen
percent by 1998). The PRC reminded the United States that it already
had made dramatic cuts in industrial tariffs, from an average of 42.7
percent in 1992 to twenty-three percent by December 1996. (The
United States countered that twenty-three percent was the highest
average in APEC. However, by September 1999 the PRC's average
industrial tariff rate had fallen to 16.7 percent.)
0 Quotas. The PRC would offer to phase out import quotas on
cars and mini-buses within eight years. Upon accession, it would
abolish quotas for sixty-six items, including sugar. More generally,
the PRC promised, if it acceded before 2005, it would abolish all
NTBs by then. It also reminded the United States that between 1992-
98, it had reduced, or was planning to reduce, NTBs from 1,247 to
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less than 400.
e Trading rights. Within three to five years of joining the WTO,
any firm (foreign or domestic) would be able to import goods into
China, or export them from China, without a license. With no li-
censing requirement, Chinese SOEs would lose their monopoly on
trade with the outside world. Moreover, foreign companies and Chi-
nese companies would be able to trade directly with each other: no
longer would they need to trade only with and through certain state
trading corporations.
* SOEs. The import purchasing procedures of SOEs would be
transparent and comply with WTO rules.
0 Non-discrimination. Foreign companies would be guaranteed
national treatment as regards the pricing and procurement of goods
and services offered for the domestic market.
* FDI. In many industries, it no longer was necessary to invest
in the PRC through a JV. The requirement that a JV must export as
much as it imports, and that it must earn as much foreign exchange
as it buys, was removed. The obligation on JVs to buy Chinese raw
materials and components, and to export a minimum amount of their
production (sometimes as much as ninety percent of output), would
be dropped in the future.
* Financial services. The PRC would allow a larger number of
foreign branches to operate in the banking, insurance, and securities
sectors.
o Foreign exchange. In 1996, the PRC made the yuan converti-
ble on the current account. It agreed to work toward making the yuan
convertible on the capital account as well.
0 Intellectual Property Rights. The PRC already had closed
down many factories making pirated software and video-cassette
disks. It pledged to continue to do so. In addition, it would accept all
of the terms of the TRIPS Agreement upon accession, and would not
ask for the S & D treatment that Agreement affords to developing
countries.
0 Agriculture. The PRC would ban export subsidies, though it
would reserve the right to support farm prices.
* Transparency. The PRC agreed it would enforce only pub-
lished laws and regulations, it would make translations available, and
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WTO Members would have the opportunity to comment on proposed
new rules before they took effect.
o Rule of law. The PRC agreed to establish independent tribu-
nals to review all administrative actions questioned by foreign trad-
ers.
o Subsidies. All WTO-inconsistent subsidies (including agri-
cultural export subsidies) would be phased out.
Moreover, in October 1997, Sir Leon Brittain, the EU's trade
commissioner at the time, announced the Chinese agreed to four
principles to accelerate WTO accession:
0 Discrimination. The PRC would not discriminate against im-
ported goods or foreign companies.
o Quotas. The PRC would phase out all import quotas according
to a clear schedule.
o Tariffs. The PRC would eliminate most of its tariff peaks, and
cut tariffs by more than one-third, to below the average in LDCs.
o Services. The PRC would offer more balanced and equitable
access to foreign service providers, in part by providing more bank-
ing and insurance licenses to foreign companies.
The concessions and agreed-upon principles were significant. For
instance, were it considered a developing country, the PRC could
keep agricultural export subsidies during a transition period. Hence,
the PRC was surrendering a right to which it arguably was entitled.
In addition, the elimination of quotas for cars and mini-buses over an
eight-year period was a major change from the initial Chinese posi-
tion in favor of a fifteen-year period, and from the previous offer of
twelve years.
The PRC also argued that during the 1997-98 Asian currency cri-
sis, it had not devalued the yuan. Devaluation would have served the
PRC's mercantilist interests - lowering the cost of its exports relative
to products from other Asian countries. The PRC, however, argued it
had behaved responsibly and eschewed this course because it did not
want to catalyze a round of competitive devaluation in Asia reminis-
3. The PRC has continued to say it would not do so, though there was talk in
November 1999 of widening the band in which the yuan was allowed to trade
against the United States dollar.
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cent of the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the 1930s.
Although the United States was relieved, it was unmoved. A
country had to be more than merely responsible in its international
economic policy to warrant WTO accession. Moreover, avoiding de-
valuation served the PRC's own interests. Devaluation would raise
the cost of imports of raw materials and machinery, which the PRC
needed to fuel its industrial growth. It would put immense pressure
on the Hong Kong dollar peg - HK $7.8 to U.S. $1 - which was a
cornerstone of stability for the PRC and had weathered strong
speculative attacks from foreign exchange traders. Furthermore,
many of the products the PRC exported were not substitutable with
those from other Asian countries. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan all ex-
ported higher value-added products, so a devaluation of the yuan
would not necessarily help the PRC's competitive position in the re-
gion.
What about the PRC's better argument - that reformers had carried
the day and offered major new concessions, of the likes listed above,
to merit WTO accession? The United States was unimpressed, and it
remained so even after President Clinton's summit in Beijing with
President Jiang in June 1998. It found some of the concessions of-
fered by the PRC to be half-hearted and the Sir Leon again was in-
troducing division in the allied ranks by playing "good cop.",4 For ex-
ample, the PRC's promise to eliminate WTO-inconsistent subsidies
seemed impressive. The PRC, however, was vague about assuring
transparency with respect to identifying the nature, amount, and
beneficiaries of the subsidies. Another example was the PRC's
promise to eliminate the need for foreign companies in order to trade
only with or through certain SOEs. The PRC wanted to retain state
trading arrangements for eight products it regarded as basic necessi-
ties (e.g., fuel, grain, and wool), and it sought transition periods of
three to five years for an additional six products (e.g., rubber and
timber) in which between sixty to 100 Chinese companies had exclu-
sive trading rights. Worse yet, the overall ostensible equality of
treatment as between foreign and Chinese companies with regard to
trading rights was a chimera. Although the PRC did not allow for-
4. The divisions would soon worsen. New Zealand announced in the fall of
1997 it was satisfied with the terms the PRC was offering in their proposed bilat-
eral agreement.
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eign companies to import goods, distribution still required govern-
ment-run trading houses.
The Americans also found examples of empty commitments. First,
the promise of a standstill was undermined by new and proposed
protectionist measures. For instance, in mid- 1997 the PRC's Ministry
of Labor issued new rules for safety inspections of imported pressure
valves, boilers, and valves used in power generators and textile mills.
Foreign companies using these imported items had to pay for Chi-
nese inspectors to travel to every factory that supplied parts for these
items and certify that those plants complied with unspecified safety
regulations. The total cost borne by foreign companies per inspection
was approximately $100,000 - a S15,000 fee, plus travel expenses.
Moreover, many inspectors worked for research institutes with ties to
Chinese companies that made similar equipment, leading to the pos-
sibility of industrial espionage. Hence, industrial espionage could oc-
cur.
Regarding FDI, the PRC proposed to end the rule that a foreign
company must balance its trade, i.e., that it must export products to
raise foreign currency, or simply import the needed currency. That
rule was designed to ensure that when the company needed foreign
currency to pay for imports it needed for its production process, or
for capital goods, the company would not obtain the currency by
buying it locally and thus deplete the PRC's own foreign exchange
reserves. Yet (as in the above list), in 1996 the PRC had made the
yuan convertible on the current account. That decision meant foreign
companies could buy foreign currency for the purpose of importing
goods and services. They no longer had to export their goods from
the PRC to get hard currency, nor did they have to import hard cur-
rency.
E. THE Low POINT: EARLY AND MID 1999
By the end of 1998, a bilateral concession agreement - not to
mention a protocol on accession - was nowhere in sight. Each side
was fed up with the other. To the Chinese, the Americans were
pushing too hard. To the Americans, the Chinese approach was des-
ultory. Amazingly, the situation got worse before it got better. In the
long history of the PRC's efforts to join the GATT and WTO, no
discrete period was as replete with negative developments as the first
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half of 1999. In April, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji visited the
United States amidst high expectations that the two sides would fi-
nally reach an agreement. Indeed, they had been negotiating fever-
ishly in March, with the USTR, Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky,
visiting Beijing twice that month. Premier Zhu was personally enthu-
siastic about joining the WTO, and wanted to wrap up a deal after
thirteen years. During the Premier's trip, the Chinese made signiFi-
cant additional concessions on market access. For example:
* Tariffs. The average tariff rate on industrial products would be
reduced from 24.6 percent to 9.44 percent. Two-thirds of this reduc-
tion would be implemented by 2003, and, with a few exceptions, the
balance by 2005. But even for the most important exception, vehicles
(including cars), the reductions would be dramatic. By 2005, the
agreement would slash tariffs on vehicles from between eighty to
100 percent to twenty-five percent. The cuts would be phased in
equally each year. Tariffs on auto parts would decrease to an average
of ten percent. The PRC agreed to join in various zero-tariff ar-
rangements, and re-affirmed its commitment to participate in the In-
formation Technology Agreement ("ITA"). As a result of the ITA, its
tariffs on semi-conductors would fall from an average of 13.3 per-
cent to zero.
o NTBs. All import quotas, including those for agricultural
products and vehicles, would be phased out by 2005.
* Distribution rights. The restrictions on distribution (which the
PRC acknowledged to be a service and thus governed by WTO dis-
ciplines, specifically, the GATS) would be phased out within three
years. For sensitive sectors like chemical fertilizers, crude oil, and
petroleum products, the phase-out period would be five years. Thus,
foreign companies would be allowed to import, export, and distribute
their goods within the PRC. They would do so by forming JVs with
local trading companies. Including processed petroleum products
(e.g., gasoline) in the offer to allow foreign companies distribution
rights was significant, because the PRC's oil industry was heavily
protected, and arguably strategic.
0 SOEs. Purchases and sales of goods and services by SOEs
would not be regarded as government procurement. Therefore, they
would be covered by GATT-WTO rules. (Otherwise, they would be
wholly exempt from GATT-WTO disciplines unless and until the
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PRC joined the Uruguay Round plurilateral Agreement on Govern-
ment Procurement. Even then, the Agreement - which only about
twenty-five WTO Members have joined - is riddled with exceptions
and exemptions.)
® Intellectual Property Rights. All government agencies would
be directed to use only licensed software, and would have to scale
back requirements for foreign companies to transfer technology in
return for the right to invest in the PRC.
0 Financial services. Foreign banks would be allowed to engage
in all forms of foreign currency business with foreign clients as soon
as the PRC entered the WTO, and with Chinese clients one year
thereafter. Foreign banks would be able to engage in all types of lo-
cal currency business with Chinese companies within two years of
accession, and with individual Chinese account holders within five
years of accession. All geographic restrictions would be phased out
over five years. In addition, insurance companies could engage in
more types of business.
0 Telecommunications. The general prohibition against foreign
investment in the Chinese telecom industry would be eliminated.
Foreign telecom providers would have improved market access by
allowing them to take an equity interest of up to forty-nine percent in
any Chinese telecom company within four years. For paging services
and value-added services (e.g., network and information services),
foreign companies would be allowed to hold a controlling fifty-one
percent stake in Chinese telecom companies. The geographic restric-
tion that limits foreign telecom companies to Shanghai and
Guangzhou would be phased out, and the Beijing - Shanghai -
Guangzhou corridor would be open for FDI immediately. In addi-
tion, the PRC agreed to adopt the American cellular phone standard
(CDMA, for "code division multiple access"), not the European
standard (known as GSM).
* Agriculture. Average tariff rates on agricultural products
would drop to seventeen percent by 2004. For products considered a
priority by the United States, the average would fall to 14.5 percent
by 2004. Tariffs on soybeans, a key American export, would fall to
three percent immediately, and tariffs on beef, another important
American export, would fall to twelve percent by 2004. Tariffs on
citrus fruit would fall from forty to twelve percent, and tariffs on
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wine would fall from sixty-five to twenty percent. For bulk com-
modities, like barley, corn, cotton, soybean oil, rice, and wheat, the
PRC would use a tariff-rate quota. A minimal tariff of one to three
percent would be charged on below-quota imports, and a high tariff
would be imposed on over-quota shipments. The quotas would be set
well in excess of current import levels, so the high tariff usually
would not be relevant.
" SPS measures. Unjustified SPS measures would be terminated.
For example, the PRC agreed to end its long-standing ban on wheat
from the Pacific northwest. It had imposed the ban in 1979 because
the wheat contained a plant fungal disease, TCK smut, but the United
States maintained there was no scientific justification for concern.
The PRC agreed to a higher tolerance level for the fungus so as to
allow most American-grown wheat. (In February 2000, the PRC
formally ended the ban and made a symbolic purchase of 50,000
metric tons of wheat, worth $6 million.) As another example, the
PRC would drop the requirement that American meat-packing plants
exporting to the PRC undergo inspections by PRC officials. Finally,
an SPS ban on citrus would be lifted.
* Cultural industries. The rule barring foreign companies from
owning and operating Chinese cinemas would be eliminated, and
FDI in this sector would be allowed.
To the USTR, the economic and foreign policy interests of the
United States were satisfied. All trade hands expected an imminent
dramatic - and positive - announcement. None was made. In both
countries, domestic political considerations overwhelmed economic
and foreign policy interests. In the United States, President Clinton's
standing in Congress had been weakened badly by two scandals: al-
leged illegal Chinese campaign contributions, and his involvement
with Monica Lewinsky, a situation which led ultimately to his im-
peachment by the House of Representatives. Now, a third scandal
erupted: apparent thefts of nuclear weapons technology by the PRC.
In the spring and summer of 1999, the Clinton Administration was
accused of negligence in enforcing security at United States' nuclear
weapons laboratories, and of lax export controls. A lengthy congres-
sional report, released by Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Ca.) on May 25,
did more than merely recount the lapses. It concluded that the PRC
had succeeded in stealing secrets, enabling them to make and deploy
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far more accurate, long-range strategic weapons such as the W88
Trident ballistic missile warhead. WTO accession negotiations be-
came politicized and diminished in importance. Any deal would have
to provide the President political cover from the vocal anti-China
lobby, a strange collection of bed fellows: environmental, labor, hu-
man rights, religious, and consumer organizations, plus unrecon-
structed hard-line Cold Warriors.
The essence of the problem was that if the United States were to
reach a bilateral concession agreement with the PRC and thereby
pave the way to WTO accession for China, then President Clinton
would need Congressional support in three ways. First, there was
sure to be a resolution disapproving of the deal, and the President
would need forces in Congress to defeat it. To be sure, Congress had
never voted on GATT or WTO membership of another country be-
fore, but they saw the PRC case differently. As early as 1997, House
Minority Leader Richard Gephardt proposed legislation giving Con-
gress the right to veto any bilateral concession agreement. In early
1999, Senator Tim Hutchinson of Arkansas sponsored a bill requir-
ing a joint Senate-House resolution before a WTO deal with the PRC
could enter into force. Several other legislators had made similar
proposals, and all had failed. Yet, more efforts surely would be made
once the President accepted an offer from the PRC.
Second, the President would have to persuade Congress to grant
the PRC permanent MFN treatment, thereby exempting it from the
annual waiver process conducted under the Jackson-Vanik Amend-
ment. Third, the President would have to satisfy, or modify, the
terms of a rather obscure provision of the 1988 Act concerning
SOEs. Essentially, that provision would suspend the application of
the Uruguay Round agreements by the United States to the PRC be-
cause of its SOEs, unless and until certain stringent conditions were
satisfied.
The USTR, backed by the State Department and National Security
Council, pressed the President to accept the deal. Top Clinton aides,
Chief of Staff John Podesta, and Gene Sperling, head of the National
Economic Council, backed by the Treasury Department, worried that
if the President did not hold out for more concessions, the deal might
not be attractive enough to overcome Congressional opposition. The
latter group won. Even if it were in the United States' economic and
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foreign policy interests to accept Premier Zhu's new concessions, the
President simply lacked the political clout in Congress to carry
through on the existing offer.
Thus, the President backed away, arguing more concessions from
the PRC were needed. The two sides vowed to restart the negotia-
tions and complete a bilateral agreement by the end of 1999. Still, the
Chinese Premier left without an agreement, causing him considerable
loss of face at home. That embarrassment was one example of a for-
eign policy interest compromised in favor of domestic political con-
siderations. Zhu was an energetic, pro-western reformer, and his di-
minished standing with hard-line, protectionist, or militaristic
officials in his government was not good for the United States.
In the PRC, Premier Zhu's standing clearly had been hurt. Many
of the concessions offered by the Premier drew fierce criticism. As
one department head at an industrial ministry in Beijing said: "The
Premier offered the Americans far too much. It is absurd. What is he
trying to do? Bankrupt everyone?" Xie Yutang, the mayor of Jihan
(capital of the northern province of Shandong), argued that every one
percentage point reduction in tariffs would lead to a five percentage
point increase in the market share of foreign goods. He bristled at
Zhu's offer to reduce vehicle import tariffs. Without protection, Ji-
han's National Heavy Truck Corporation, a large local employer,
would be destroyed. Still other senior Chinese officials went so far as
to accuse Zhu of betraying the country.
Certainly, part of the blame lay with the Premier, since he had ne-
glected to get approval from all of the relevant ministries in Beijing
before offering to make the concessions. However, the USTR had
compounded Zhu's difficulties. On April 8, with negotiations still
underway, and without consulting the Chinese, the USTR claimed to
chronicle Zhu's offer in a seventeen page document, entitled "Market
Access and Protocol Commitments." Released over the internet, the
document caught Zhu off guard and enraged Chinese trade negotia-
tors.
Subsequently, during April and May, the Chinese government
quickly backpedaled. It disavowed the document, claiming it had
never made many of the alleged promises. The PRC had not, for in-
stance, agreed to importation and distribution rights for American oil
companies. All foreign companies operating gas stations in the PRC
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would still have to buy their gasoline from one of three SOEs that
control all importation rights. The PRC also withdrew some of its
concessions. For instance, it stated its desire to protect its domestic
car industry for eight years after WTO accession. On banking, insur-
ance, telecommunications and FDI, the PRC either diluted or with-
drew its offers. For example, the PRC claimed it would not allow
foreign companies to hold a controlling stake in Chinese telecommu-
nication firms for "information security reasons."
As a result, pro-reform, pro-liberalization forces in Beijing, led by
MOFTEC, were forced to walk a tightrope. On the one hand, they
had to convince officials throughout the PRC, particularly in SOEs
and their ministries, at the provincial level, and in rural areas, that
Premier Zhu had not offered traitorous concessions. They had to ar-
gue again that WTO accession would be a net benefit for the PRC.
On the other hand, they had to yield to the United States just enough
to secure a bilateral agreement. For a while, this balancing act
seemed to work. On April 27, He Yafei, the Minister-Counselor at
the PRC's embassy in Washington, optimistically opined that "[t]he
deal is 99% done." However, shortly thereafter, the tightrope
snapped for reasons having nothing to do with trade.
On May 7, in the midst of the Kosovo conflict, a NATO warplane,
with an American pilot, bombed the PRC's embassy in Belgrade,
causing severe damage, and killing three Chinese journalists and in-
juring twenty-seven civilians. Since news of the incident first came
over the internet, not the official media, Chinese censors had no
chance to "package" the information. Thousands of Chinese - led
initially by students with internet access - took to the streets in Bei-
jing, attacking the United States Embassy, throwing stones, and
burning the American flag. The scene played out on television, re-
minding America of the takeover of its embassy in Tehran twenty
years earlier.
The disturbances were not limited to Beijing. In Chengdu, rowdy
civilians burned the residence of the American Consulate General. At
Fudan University in Shanghai, when an American professor walked
in the classroom, a Chinese student stood up and shouted "I hate
Americans and I have nothing to learn from you!" In Xian, the Hyatt
hotel also attracted public protests. Throughout China cinemas sus-
pended screenings of American movies and China Central Television
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withdrew advertisements for American goods.
The violent explosion unsettled the Chinese government. It
delayed broadcasting President Clinton's apology for the bombing
for two days. Worried about losing control of the volatile situation,
the government reversed course, restoring order, and taking pains to
assure American investors that China was still open for business -
and tourism. The government also took into account its fifty-five ra-
cial minorities: to condone further nationalistic demonstrations
risked alienating them.
Naturally, the destruction of its Belgrade Embassy outraged the
Chinese government. It suspended WTO accession negotiations until
the United States fulfilled four conditions: 1) apologize for the
bombing; 2) prosecute those responsible; 3) pay compensation for
the loss of life and for destruction of the building; and 4) provide a
thorough explanation for the bombing. President Clinton promptly
apologized, the Central Intelligence Agency eventually dismissed
one mid-level official and disciplined six others, although Beijing
appeared unimpressed at the lack of severity of the action. Regarding
the third condition, President Clinton prepared to negotiate. Initially,
the United States paid $4.5 million to the families of those killed and
injured in the bombing and agreed to a further $28 million compen-
satory payment for property damage. (Conversely, the PRC covered
the $2.87 million cost of damages to the American Embassy in Bei-
jing). As to the fourth condition, owing to a lengthy internal investi-
gation, over one month passed before Clinton could send a special
emissary to Beijing. On June 16, Undersecretary of State Thomas
Pickering, delivered a one-word explanation: accident. The formal
explanation finally arrived in April 2000, unchanged. The pilot had
been guided by outdated Yugoslav and CIA maps, showing the em-
bassy at its previous address; Pentagon data bases had not been up-
dated with the embassy's most recent location, and the target review
system had failed to spot the error. Furthermore, the plane actually
had targeted the Yugoslav military supply headquarters a few hun-
dred yards from the embassy. The PRC publicly rejected Pickering's
explanation as "unconvincing and unacceptable," and the People 's
Daily lampooned it as a "tale for the Arabian nights." Privately, PRC
officials appeared persuaded that no senior United States government
official had ordered the attack on their embassy. Nevertheless many
remained deeply suspicious that the United States could commit so
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grievous an intelligence error. Perhaps, they thought, "rogue" ele-
ments in the CIA or Pentagon had somehow managed to carry out
the bombing.
Because of this situation, an agreement on WTO accession was
farther away than ever before. To make matters worse, the very divi-
sion among the ranks feared by American trade negotiators materi-
alized. In July 1999, Japan signed a bilateral agreement with the
PRC, backing down on tough conditions for telecommunications
market access. Moreover, during the summer, tensions between the
PRC and Taiwan when Taiwan's President, Lee Tung Hui, charac-
terized relations between the two countries as "state-to-state." Once
again, the PRC unleashed menacing military maneuvers and heated
rhetoric. Privately the United States assured Taiwan of military as-
sistance, and stepped up weapons sales to the island. They did not
rule out including Taiwan in the proposed Theater Missile Defense
(TMD) system, a regional shield to protect Japan, Korea, and other
countries. That the saber-rattling did not crescendo with a war re-
mained the only bright spot.
G. THE FINAL PUSH FOR A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE
UNITED STATES: FALL 1999
Fortunately, by the late summer of 1999, much of the domestic
opposition in the PRC to WTO accession apparently abated. On
September 2, the two sides agreed to resume talks about WTO acces-
sion. Why the shift? Perhaps Premier Zhu and his allies hoped to
quash opposition to their reform plans through WTO accession.
Joining the WTO meant exposing SOEs and their protective minis-
tries to foreign competition thereby weakening them. Another an-
swer is that President Jiang wanted accession, as well as a close,
strategic partnership with the United States, to define the legacy of
his tenure in office. In any case, time was running out.
A less cynical answer may be that the PRC stared into a bleak fu-
ture: if no deal was done soon, no deal would get done for several
years. Like Taiwan, the PRC may have understood that if it did not
accede before the scheduled start of a new WTO negotiating round,
the Millennium Round, the "ante" would increase as a result of that
round's new trade liberalization agreements. As a related issue, the
PRC hoped that the 2000 American presidential campaign would not
2000] 1505
AM. U. INT'LL. REV[
further entangle the issue, with both candidates calling for tougher
and tougher negotiations with the PRC.
The success of the marketing campaign by the pro-reform, pro-
liberalization officials provides one of the most plausible reasons for
the shift. The PRC's State Development Planning Commission
("SDPC"), which is responsible for overseeing economic reforms
and the restructuring of SOEs, harbored strong reservations about
joining the WTO. In early September, however, an SDPC vice-
minister, Wang Chunzheng, declared that the advantages of WTO
membership would outweigh the disadvantages. Later that month,
the SDPC Chairman, Zeng Peiyan, reaffirmed the PRC's commit-
ment to lower trade barriers and increased market access in service
sectors, especially banking, accounting, law, aviation, tourism, re-
tailing and wholesaling. The finance minister, Xiang Huaicheng,
added that lowering tariffs would not cause a budgetary strain be-
cause larger import volumes-attributable in part to a reduced in-
centive to smuggle-would offset the lower rate. In brief, on the
merits, the PRC seemed to sense its vital domestic interests lay on
the side of accession, which would lead to greater market access for
Chinese exports overseas and to increased flows of foreign capital
into the PRC. Both results would bolster the PRC's economy and re-
form efforts.
This forecast received support from an unexpected quarter: the
International Trade Commission ("ITC"). In fall 1999, the ITC pub-
lished its Assessment of the Economic Effects on the United States of"
China's Accession to the WTO (Inv. No. 332-403, Publications 3228
and 3229). The ITC considered the overall impact of accession based
on the tariff and NTB cuts Premier Zhu had offered in April. The ef-
fects on the American economy would be negligible, although the
bilateral trade deficit with the PRC would expand. This is because
while American exports of beverages, corn, cotton, machinery, to-
bacco, and vegetable oils would rise, Chinese exports of textiles, ap-
parel, and other products would also grow dramatically. The ITC
also reported the PRC would benefit from the liberalization associ-
ated with WTO accession, in the form of significant growth effects.
The USTR maintained that the talks on a bilateral concession
agreement ought to begin where the negotiations had left off in April
- with Premier's Zhu's concessions. That meant the same range of
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issues remained on the table and the United States had some new
concerns in certain areas. For example:
l Tariffs. The United States remained concerned about tariff
spikes affecting industrial equipment.
* Safeguards. The United States wanted special rules to combat
anticipated import surges, following PRC accession. The PRC agreed
that simple market disruption criteria, based on an existing federal
statute applicable to non-market economies, rather than the more
stringent escape clause standards that require a showing of injury or
threat of injury (set forth in Section 201 of the 1974 Act) could trig-
ger a safeguard action. The two sides could not agree on how long
the special rules would apply.
* Antiduniping ("AD"). The United States advocated special
rules to combat alleged dumping of Chinese steel. The rules would
make Chinese steel imports more susceptible to AD actions than
steel from other WTO Members.
* FDL The United States found the phase-in periods for some of
the PRC's commitments on investment to be too long. Moreover, the
PRC's concessions on FDI were less valuable now, because the
"China market" had soured. During the 1990s, China's annual in-
crease in FDI averaged over forty percent, peaking in 1993 at a stag-
gering 175 percent. It seemed as though Ford Motor Company
Chairman Alex Troutman spoke for many CEO's when he said, "I
can't go down in history as the Ford chairman who missed China."
But, in 1999, for the first time in two decades, Foreign Direct In-
vestment fell. Multinational Corporations ("MNCs") that were inter-
ested in tapping China's pool of cheap labor, selling to Chinese con-
sumers, or supplying factories of other foreign investors, now lost
sizeable sums. Of China's 1.3 billion people, only twenty to thirty
million on the east coast could afford foreign brands. Furthermore,
the distribution network remained poor, easily moving goods from
China's interior to exporting port cities, but failing to channel im-
ported goods into the far reaches of the country. Government bu-
reaucracy remained a serious barrier to obtaining necessary approv-
als, even for minor operations. Thus, the PRC would have to offer
significantly larger number of concessions aimed at improving the
investment climate.
* Telecommunications. The United States insisted that China
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permit foreign telecommunications companies to own up to a fifty-
one percent stake in Chinese telecom service providers.
0 Financial and other services. The United States insisted on
improved market access offers for banking, automobile financing,
and insurance. A foreign insurer could not apply for an operating li-
cense, unless it had maintained a representative office in the PRC for
at least two years. Once granted, a license restricted operation to
Shanghai and Guangzhou and required the foreign insurer to join
with a Chinese joint venture partner. Worse yet, PRC authorities in-
sisted on picking such partners for foreign life insurers. In addition,
the United States argued that foreign insurers ought to be able to sell
all products, including group insurance, health, and pension policies.
These three areas represented eighty-five percent of the total pre-
mium income in the PRC. However, such policies confined foreign
insurers to selling individual life policies. In addition, foreign insur-
ers should be able to sell their products to all customers. While prop-
erty and casualty insurers could open branch offices, they could deal
only with foreign-owned or joint venture companies. The United
States also sought improvements on the PRC's offer concerning for-
eign banks, securities firms, and professional services.
* Textiles. The two sides had yet to agree on a schedule for
phasing out American quotas on Chinese textiles. Under intense
pressure from the American Textile Manufacturers Institute
("ATMI"), and mindful of the need to secure support from members
of Congress from textile states, the USTR pressed for a ten-year
phase out period, lasting until 2010, five years longer than provided
for under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
("ATC"). The ATC eliminated quotas on textiles from all other
WTO Members as of 2005. With the PRC as the world's largest sin-
gle country exporter of textile and apparel products, the ATMI esti-
mated that granting the PRC a quota phase-out in 2005, rather than
2010, would result in the loss of 154,500 American jobs, $4 billion
in textile sales, and $7.6 billion in apparel sales. However, the PRC
wanted the American textile quotas phased out according to the stan-
dard five year schedule.
* Cultural industries. The United States sought an improved of-
fer for audiovisual services. The PRC had an unofficial limit of al-
lowing just ten American films to be shown in the country each year,
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which state-owned distributors bought for a flat fee. The Motion
Picture Association of America lobbied for an increase in 1999 to
seventeen; and an increase by 2000 to twenty-five.
In addition to these reservations, some matters from 1996-98 re-
mained at issue while a few new incarnations of old problems also
appeared. After all, as Representative Sander M. Levin (D-Mich.)
said, "in deciding whether to support an agreement [on accession],
most members of Congress will ask themselves: 'How will it affect
the living standards of my constituents and the American people?'
For Congress to answer positively, the PRC would need to address
the majority of American demands.
Negotiations began in earnest in September 1999, following
meetings between American and Chinese officials, including the two
Presidents, at the APEC summit in Auckland. Significantly, how-
ever, the Chinese continued to disavow some of the sweeping con-
cessions Premier Zhu had made in April.
This was not necessarily the starting point that the USTR wanted,
but the Embassy bombing had clearly weakened China's domestic
position, rendering it incapable of dramatic concessions. Moreover,
Premier Zhu himself no longer controlled the negotiations. Having
both lost face and incurred the wrath of many PRC bureaucrats after
the April debacle, he had to cede leadership on many economic is-
sues to President Jiang. Thus, Shi Guangsheng, the Minister of
MOFTEC (i.e., the PRC's counterpart to the USTR), said that "the
views of our two sides are very different," and that with respect to
the infamous list the USTR published in April: "[w]ithin the list
there are some items that China has committed itself to. But many
are things that China has not agreed to and will not agree to in the
future." In other words, this offer qualified as nothing more than an
American wish list. The Minister even resurrected an old demand:
developing country status. As Foreign Ministry Spokesman Sun
Yuxi said, "China, as a universally recognized developing country,
will not accept any condition that goes beyond the economic capacity
of China, and will not undermine its national interests."
Perhaps, in truth, the PRC had lost some enthusiasm for WTO ac-
cession, as Chinese leaders sent mixed signals. At the APEC summit,
President Jiang reiterated a pledge, initially made in 1996-97, to
lower industrial tariffs to fifteen percent by 2000, adding that the
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PRC would drop them to ten percent before 2005. He assured the
United States of the PRC's continuing commitment to opening its
economy to FDI, allowing foreign banks to conduct local currency
business and start JV trading firms, and combating IPR piracy. How-
ever, Wu Jichuan, Minister of Information Industries, a conservative
rival of Premier Zhu, declared his opposition to allowing foreign en-
try into the PRC's telecommunications and internet services markets
unless WTO members forced this concession upon the PRC.
That statement, followed in late October by an announcement that
the PRC would prohibit new foreign investment in the internet, was
potentially bad news for several American internet companies:
America Online, which owns a stake of China.com (a Chinese por-
tal), for Dow Jones and Intel, which have part ownership of
Sohu.com (a Chinese internet company), and for all other foreign
companies eagerly eyeing the rapidly growing telecom and internet
market in the PRC. The forced unwinding of more than $1.4 billion
in foreign investment through joint ventures with Unicom, a Chinese
state-owned telecommunications carrier was equally bad. Yet, Mr.
Wu had good reason for his position. He feared foreign telecom
companies would seek entry only into the most lucrative business
markets in the Beijing - Shanghai - Guangzhou corridor, dumping
the responsibility of providing services to less profitable areas, such
as north-west China, on the government.
Still, the accession negotiations continued throughout the fall of
1999 amidst an atmosphere of cautious optimism, occasional doubt,
and regret that the Clinton Administration had walked away from the
April deal. In early October, the PRC announced it would open more
cities to foreign insurance companies, and issue more licenses to
overseas ventures. The crucial questions of "when?" and "how
many?" remained unanswered. Later that month, during a trip to the
PRC by Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, the two sides reaf-
firmed their shared commitment to Chinese accession "at the earliest
possible date." In early November, President Clinton telephoned
President Jiang and dispatched Ambassador Barshefsky to Beijing to
try and work out a deal with Minister Guangsheng before the Seattle
WTO Ministerial Conference, scheduled for November 30-
December 3. Almost simultaneously, telecommunications, a key
sector, provided a setback. The PRC's Ministry of Information In-
dustries announced plans to impose production quotas and import re-
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strictions on foreign manufacturers of mobile phone handsets in or-
der to help nine fledgling domestic companies. The foreign compa-
nies-principally Ericsson (Sweden), Motorola (United States), and
Nokia (Finland)-controlled about eighty-five percent of China's
market, the world's fastest growing market for mobile phones. The
Ministry said it would strive to ensure domestic companies gained a
fifty percent share of the local handset market by allocating produc-
tion quotas to foreign and local manufacturers after negotiation. Each
company would receive a number of government-issued seals equal
to its production quota, and every mobile phone it sold would have to
bear the official seal.
II. THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER
15, 1999
Amidst the roller coaster of expectations and emotions, House
Majority Leader Richard Armey (R-Tex.) was a leading voice in the
rising chorus urging a rapid and successful conclusion: "History has
proven time and again that expanded trade is a crucial tool in ex-
panding democracy and undermining tyranny .... We must look to
expanded trade as a significant opportunity to build greater under-
standing and encouragement of freedom and democracy among the
people of mainland China." Far more was at stake than market access
for foreign firms or the need to bolster the process of market-
transition reform in the PRC.
Perhaps this grander vision of the stakes propelled the two sides,
to a final deal, on November 15, 1999. Or, perhaps a shared personal
demon motivated Presidents Jiang and Clinton: securing their mutual
places in history. President Jiang, in contrast to Deng Xiaoping and
his open-door policy, had no great defining moment to his tenure.
President Clinton, in the words of the Financial Times, "is desper-
ately trying to forge a historical legacy that goes beyond sex scan-
dals," and to "bury the memory" of one of his most serious foreign
policy errors, namely, turning down the April offer from Premier
Zhu.
Whatever the impetus, following several days of tense negotia-
tions in Beijing between Ambassador Barshefsky and Premier Zhu
and Minister Guangsheng, the United States and the PRC signed an
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historic bilateral agreement paving the way for Chinese accession to
the WTO. The key points of the deal, detailed in 250 pages of text,
were as follows:
0 Tariffs. The PRC agreed to reduce overall tariffs from an aver-
age of 22.1 percent to an average of seventeen percent. It promised to
slash tariffs on industrial goods from the 1997 average of 24.6 per-
cent to 9.4 percent by 2005, with the majority of cuts by 2003. Re-
garding industrial products considered by the United States to be a
priority (i.e., in which the United States has a keen export interest),
the PRC agreed to reduce tariffs to 7.1 percent. The PRC also agreed
to participate in the ITA; thereby committing itself to reducing tariffs
on computers, computer equipment, semiconductors, and internet-
related equipment from 13.3 percent to zero by 2005.
* Quotas. The PRC agreed to eliminate all import quotas on in-
dustrial goods by 2005, with most quotas abolished by 2002. For pri-
ority American products (e.g., optic fiber cable), the PRC agreed it
would eliminate quotas immediately upon accession. While still in
operation, quotas will grow at an annual rate of fifteen percent to en-
sure that market access increases progressively.
* Agriculture. The PRC agreed to reduce the overall agricultural
tariffs to seventeen percent by January 2004. This reduction was
considerable, as the PRC's tariffs on farm goods ranged from twenty
to fifty percent, with an average rate of 31.5 percent. Moreover, on
agricultural products the United States considers a priority, the PRC
agreed to cut tariffs by January 2004 from an average of 31.5 percent
to an average of 14.5 percent. These products include beef (with a
pre-agreement rate of forty-five percent and a post-agreement rate of
twelve percent), cheese (fifty percent and twelve percent), poultry
(twenty percent and ten percent), and wine (sixty-five percent and
twelve percent). The PRC also agreed to liberalize purchases of bulk
agricultural commodities by establishing tariff-rate quotas ("TRQs")
for barley, corn, cotton, rice, and wheat, and phasing out state trading
of soy oil. The quota thresholds in these TRQs will be high and the
applicable tariff for over-quota shipments will average between one
and three percent. Private traders are reserved a share of the TRQs
(On some items, such as cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil, and
sunflower-seed oil, the PRC agreed to an immediate elimination of
TRQs.) More generally, for the first time, the PRC agreed to permit
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trade in agricultural goods between private parties. Finally, the PRC
pledged to eliminate SPS measures not based on scientific evidence.
0 Automobiles. The PRC agreed to reduce tariffs on vehicles
from eighty to 100 percent to twenty-five percent by July 1, 2006,
and to make the deepest cuts within the first few years following ac-
cession. It pledged to cut tariffs on auto parts by the same date to an
average of ten percent. The United States hoped for a phase-out pe-
riod that would end by 2005; however, it agreed to the extra year in
exchange for a Chinese pledge to allow foreign non-bank financial
institutions to provide automobile financing immediately upon ac-
cession. In addition, the PRC agreed to phase out all quotas on auto
imports by 2005. Until then, it is committed to a base level quota of
$6 billion, and to increasing this level by fifteen percent annually
until the quotas are eliminated.
* Trading rights. The PRC agreed to grant foreign firms full
rights to import and export goods, with no need to trade through a
Chinese middleman. The PRC said it would phase these rights in
over three years.
* Distribution rights. The PRC agreed to grant distribution
rights to foreign exporters and manufacturers for both agricultural
and industrial goods, whether imported or made in the PRC, within
three years following accession. The foreign firms will be able to
conduct their own distribution networks, again without Chinese mid-
dlemen. They will be able to maintain wholesale or retail operations,
as well as after-sales services (e.g., repair, maintenance, and trans-
port). However, the PRC maintained some limitations on distribution
rights. For example, in the first three years after accession, foreign
oil companies are limited to thirty gas service stations in the country,
thus inhibiting the distribution of their product.
* Services atxiliar , to distribution. The PRC agreed to phase
out all restrictions on services auxiliary to distribution within three to
four years following accession. Examples of these services include
freight forwarding, packing, rental and leasing, storage and ware-
housing, and technical testing and analysis. After the phase-out pe-
riod, the PRC promised that foreign firms might establish 100 per-
cent wholly owned subsidiaries to provide these services.
* Textiles. The United States agreed to phase out textile quotas
which the Uruguay Round ATC calls for by 2005 (corresponding to
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the expiration of the MFA), even though the domestic United States
textile lobby hoped for 2010. However, after the PRC's accession,
the United States will retain a special safeguard mechanism aimed at
preventing textile import surcharges for the next twelve years for
twelve years (i.e., until December 31, 2008, which is after the Uru-
guay Round ATC expires). The United States created this remedy
especially for use against a rapid increase in Chinese textile imports
that cause, or threaten to cause, market disruption-namely, material
injury-in the United States.
Dumping. For purposes of monitoring the possible dumping of
Chinese goods, the United States will continue to treat the PRC as a
non-market economy for fifteen years after it accedes. Accordingly,
when calculating Normal Value ("NV") in the computation of the
dumping margin (the difference between NV and Export Price
("EP") or Constructed Export Price ("CEP")), the Department of
Commerce ("DOC") is likely to use a proxy, CV. To arrive at a value
for CV, the DOC will look to data from a third country, such as In-
dia, Indonesia, or Thailand or even Paraguay, as occurred in the past.
Respondents in AD cases argue this calculation-in particular, the
choice of a third country from which to gather data for CV-is
highly arbitrary and skewed toward finding a positive dumping mar-
gin. The USTR noted that the non-market economy ("NME") statute
is self-limiting; if a particular sector in a foreign economy, or an en-
tire foreign economy, demonstrates it has become market-oriented,
then the rules are not applied to that sector.
* Subsidies. The PRC agreed to eliminate all export subsidies.
The elimination of these subsidies on cotton and rice was of particu-
lar importance to the United States. In addition, the United States re-
served the right for the fifteen years following the PRC's accession
to consider the special characteristics of the PRC's economy when
applying countervailing duty ("CVD") law. In particular, in a case
involving a newly privatized company, the United States could iden-
tify and measure the benefit of a subsidy provided to that firm when
it was still an SOE, and thereby fashion an argument that the benefit
carried through to the post-privatization entity. Finally, the PRC ac-
cepted the ability of foreign governments to apply the Uruguay
Round SCM Agreement against Chinese SOEs, when appropriate.
0 Product-Specific Safeguard. In addition to the normal WTO
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safeguard mechanism pursuant to GATT Article XIX and the Uru-
guay Round Agreement on Safeguards, American firms are permit-
ted to avail themselves of a new and special safeguard remedy,
known as the Product-Specific Safeguard. This remedy addresses
imports of Chinese goods that are a significant cause, or threat, of
material injury to a United States industry. The remedy differs from a
normal safeguard action in two key respects. First, the United States
will be allowed to apply import restraints unilaterally based on crite-
ria that are less stringent than in the Agreement on Safeguards. Sec-
ond, it permits the PRC to address import surcharges by imposing
voluntary restraint agreements ("VRAs"), which are otherwise illegal
under Article 11:1 (b) of the Agreement on Safeguards. The Product-
Specific Safeguard will remain in force for twelve years following
the PRC's accession to the WTO.
* Telecommunications. The PRC agreed to open, within limits,
its telecom market to foreign companies and provide them with na-
tional treatment. Through these commitments, the PRC agreed to
join the WTO Basic Telecommunications Agreement. Consequently,
the PRC agreed to implement the pro-competitive regulatory princi-
ples set forth in the Agreement, like cost-based pricing, inter-
connection rights, the establishment of an independent regulatory
authority, and technologically-neutral scheduling (i.e., allowing for-
eign suppliers to choose which technology to use in providing tele-
com services). As for the market-opening commitments made by the
PRC, they covered two broad areas: FDI in the telecom sector, and
geographic restrictions on the provision of telecom services. With re-
spect to FDI, the PRC agreed, effective immediately upon accession,
to allow foreign companies to take up to a forty-nine percent stake in
JVs engaged in certain telecom services. After two years of member-
ship, they would be permitted a fifty percent stake in JVs providing
value-added and paging services. After five years, foreign firms
could take up to a forty-nine percent stake in JVs providing mobile
voice and data services. After six years, they could own up to forty-
nine percent of a JV providing domestic and international services.
Thus, the United States dropped its insistence that the PRC allow
foreign firms a fifty-one percent equity interest within four or five
years after accession. In return, the United States accepted immediate
forty-nine percent stakes, rising to fifty percent stakes with manage-
ment control within two years. The USTR pointed out that under
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Chinese law, contractual management and operational participation
was possible with a fifty/fifty ownership structure. Regarding geo-
graphic limitations on the provision of telecom services by foreign
firms, the PRC agreed to phase out all such restrictions for paging,
value added, and closed user groups in three years, mobile, cellular,
and data services in five years, and domestic wireline and interna-
tional services in six years. The PRC agreed to open its most impor-
tant telecom corridor-the Beijing - Shanghai - Guangzhou region,
which represents seventy-five percent of all traffic in the PRC-im-
mediately upon accession to all telecom services. The PRC also as-
sured the United States it would permit foreign firms to provide tele-
com services via satellite. Finally, PRC authorities accepted the fact
that production quotas on mobile phones they had planned would be
incongruous with GATT-WTO rules, hence they abandoned the
planned quotas.
* Internet services. Foreign companies may invest in Chinese
Internet content providers, subject to a forty-nine percent equity
limit. Whether existing foreign investments in excess of this limit
would be "grandfathered" was not clear, though arguably such in-
vestments fall within the scope of a clause providing for the con-
tinuation of existing JVs in all service sectors.
* Banking. Two years after the PRC enters the WTO, foreign
banks may conduct local currency business - deposit taking and
lending - with Chinese enterprises in specified geographical regions.
In other words, two years after accession, foreign banks will receive
qualified national treatment within those regions. Five years after the
accession, the PRC will lift customer and geographic restrictions,
and foreign banks will be able to conduct retail business (principally
taking deposits from, and making loans to, Chinese individuals) in
local currency and will be able to establish branches anywhere in the
PRC.
* Securities underwriting. The PRC agreed to permit foreign
brokerage firms to operate in the PRC, subject to fairly tight restric-
tions. Foreign firms who want to investment in Chinese securities
underwriting companies would have use a joint venture, and the for-
eign stake would be limited to thirty-three percent. The JVs would
receive national treatment in order to underwrite domestic equity of-
ferings. In addition, they could underwrite and trade in international
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equity and all corporate and government debt issues. More generally,
the PRC pledged that as the scope of business activities of Chinese
securities firms grows, there will be a concomitant expansion in the
permissible scope for foreign joint venture securities companies.
0 Fund management. The PRC agreed to permit foreign fund
managers to operate there, also subject to fairly tight restrictions.
Foreign investment in JV fund management companies will be lim-
ited to thirty-three percent upon the PRC's accession. Three years
following accession, the limit will rise to forty-nine percent. Thus,
over time, foreign financial firms will receive national treatment, and
experience an expansion in the scope of business concomitant with
Chinese firms.
* Insurance services. The PRC agreed to award licenses to for-
eign insurance companies to do business in the PRC solely on the ba-
sis of prudential criteria. The PRC pledged to abandon economic
needs tests (i.e., conditioning the grant of a license on the economic
needs of the locality in which the foreign firm proposes to do busi-
ness), and to eliminate quantitative restrictions on the number of li-
censes it issued. With respect to FDI in specific insurance activities,
the PRC agreed to grant foreign insurers the right-effective imme-
diately upon WTO accession-to take up to a fifty percent equity
stake in local life insurance companies, up to a fifty-one percent
stake in non-life insurance companies, and up to 100 percent in re-
insurance companies. (Non-life insurance products include health,
pension, and property policies). These JVs are now empowered to in-
sure large-scale risks, and foreign life insurance firms may pick their
own JV partners. However, their operations would be restricted to
key Chinese cities of priority interest to the United States during the
first two-to-three years following accession, namely, a dozen cities
including Shanghai and Guangzhou. Two years after accession, the
PRC pledged it would open up a twelve more cities, including Bei-
jing, and permit foreign non-life and re-insurance companies to form
wholly owned subsidiaries. Five years after accession, the PRC
would drop all geographic restrictions on licensing, and permit na-
tion-wide branching. Regarding the scope of activities, the PRC
agreed to allow foreign property and casualty firms to insure large-
scale commercial risks nation-wide immediately upon accession.
During a five year phase-in period, the PRC promised to expand the
scope of permissible activities of foreign insurance companies to in-
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clude group, health, and pension products. However, whether foreign
insurers could offer group plans to companies not based in the same
city as the insurer, and whether these insurers could open branch of-
fices, is still unclear. Significantly, the PRC made no commitments
on market access for foreign insurance brokers.
* Cultural industries. The PRC agreed to allow more foreign
movie companies to increase distribution significantly than the pre-
agreement limit of ten movies per year: forty in the first year fol-
lowing accession, and fifty by the third year. However, of these
films, the PRC agree to distribute only twenty on a revenue-sharing
basis. They also agreed to allow foreign companies to establish JVs
to distribute audio and video recordings, and software entertainment,
to own and operate cinemas, and to hold up to forty-nine percent of
the shares of these JVs.
* Travel and tourism. The PRC pledged that-immediately
upon accession-foreign-owned hotel companies could establish
majority-owned hotels in the PRC, with no geographic restrictions on
operations. Within three years following accession, they could set up
100 percent-owned hotels. In addition, the PRC agreed to allow for-
eign travel operators to provide the full range of travel agency serv-
ices, and have access to government resorts.
* Accounting services. The PRC agreed to eliminate its manda-
tory localization requirement, thereby promising unrestricted access
to individuals licensed in the PRC as certified public accountants
(CPAs). It pledged to transparently award accounting licenses and to
apply national treatment to foreign and Chinese applicants. Foreign-
ers would retain majority control of accounting firms.
* Legal services. The PRC promised to allow foreigners major-
ity control not only of accounting firms, but also of architectural,
computer services, dental, engineering, management consulting,
medical, and urban planning firms. Conversely, like many WTO
Members, the PRC declined to allow foreigners to hold majority
control in local legal practitioner firms.
The above list bespeaks the breathtaking nature of the negotia-
tions-and of the PRC's concessions. A broader and deeper trade
deal, with so many changes in the way the PRC interacts economi-
cally with the rest of the world, is scarcely imaginable. Yet, this was
only part of the deal.
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Upon accession, the PRC would assume all of the obligations in
the GATT-WTO regime. For example, it would have to implement
the TRIPS Agreement, and thereby eliminate trade and foreign ex-
change balancing requirements, and local content requirements. It
would have to abandon the practice of conditioning investment ap-
provals on performance requirements, offsets, and the conduct of
R&D activities in the PRC. As another example, it would have to
implement the TRIPS Agreement, and hence forswear forced tech-
nology transfer. Further still, the PRC would have to ensure that
SOEs make purchases and sales based solely on commercial consid-
erations (e.g., price, quality, availability, and marketability), and
provide foreign firms with the opportunity to compete for contracts
on non-discriminatory terms. Significantly, the PRC agreed to the
American demand that purchases and sales by SOEs would not be
considered "government procurement" - and thus would be subject to
normal GATT-WTO rules. (Were they considered government pro-
curement, the PRC could avoid signing the Agreement on Govern-
ment Procurement - a plurilateral arrangement - and thereby exempt
its massive SOE sector).
China and Canada quickly followed the United States - PRC bilat-
eral agreement was followed quickly with a similar accord. The deal
between Washington and Beijing satisfied the Canadians, but they
still had unique concerns. They sought improved market access for
key agricultural exports; namely, barley and wheat. Canada wanted
the PRC to improve its offer on tariffs and TRQs for these crops. The
PRC apparently did so, and also offered better access (in the form of
no minimum capital requirement) for Canadian small businesses in-
volved in distribution services than was set forth in the agreement
with the United States (which contained a capital requirement). Thus,
on November 26, Canada and the PRC announced their accord.
A. CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING THE NOVEMBER 15, 1999
BILATERAL AGREEMENT
One of the hotly debated issues that erupted immediately follow-
ing the November 15 bilateral agreement was whether the package
really differed from the concessions made by Premier Zhu in April.
Both sides sought to preserve "face." The United States insisted it
had gotten at least as good a deal, if not better. The PRC denied that
the April deal had been the basis for the final agreement.
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Corporate America, although generally supportive of the deal, still
had some concerns. For example, in securities underwriting and fund
management, the prospect of taking only a minority interest in a JV
was not particularly attractive. Further, on the issue of corporate in-
come taxes, the PRC announced in January 2000 that it would phase
out preferential tax policies for foreign enterprises. The PRC imple-
mented these preferences in the early 1990s to encourage FDI. Under
then-existing tax law, all corporations faced a flat thirty-three percent
annual income tax rate. But, the availability of various deductions
meant foreign companies tended to pay much less. They also bene-
fited from a two-year tax holiday, followed by from three years of
income taxation at half rates. Foreign companies in special economic
zones (e.g., Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Tianjin) got these benefits and
more. Their corporate income tax was just fifteen percent, and local
income taxes (normally around three percent) were waived. The PRC
argued it would have to level the playing field to conform with the
GATT Article 111:1-2 national treatment obligation. In fact, nothing
in Article III prevents a government from treating domestic produc-
tion less favorably than foreign manufacturing.
Organized labor immediately condemned the deal as a "grave
mistake," and pledged to oppose it. The President of the AFL-CIO,
John Sweeney, declared the WTO deal "disgustingly hypocritical,"
and said that "by continuing to persecute dissenters, to imprison la-
bor leaders and worker activists, and to export goods produced by
slave labor, China shows no interest in playing even by the most ba-
sic rules of the world economy." The Brussels-based International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions ("ICFTU") echoed these senti-
ments, reminding the PRC that during the 1996 Singapore Ministe-
rial Conference, all WTO Members pledged to uphold internationally
recognized core labor standards, and expected no less from the PRC.
Furthermore, the United States and PRC had differing opinions on
the interpretation of certain key provisions of the deal the deal. In-
surance service was a prominent example. Ma Yongwei, Chairman
of the China Insurance Regulatory Commission ("CIRC"), noted
there were two "prudential criteria" under which the PRC could deny
an operating license to a foreign insurer. First, the applicant must be
financially strong. That would mean a firm would need $30 billion in
assets, a thirty-year history, and a representative office in the PRC
for at least two years. This criterion is internationally recognized and,
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therefore, not particularly controversial. His second criterion, how-
ever, was controversial. Yongwei asserted the PRC could deny a li-
cense application if approval threatened the stability of Chinese eco-
nomic policy (specifically, monetary, credit, or financial policies).
The United States feared the PRC might block an application for
subjective reasons, such as whether local insurers could withstand
foreign competition, or would manipulate the system to continue the
tradition of granting licenses as political favors to different nations.
These concerns were not unfounded. The PRC's insurance indus-
try was anemic, partly as a result of misguided regulation. Chinese
insurers had no choice but to invest their premium income in bank
deposits or treasury bonds. These investments earned interest rates
below the rates the insurers had to pay most of their customers. Only
in November 1999 did the Chinese government allow local insurers
to invest in higher-yielding instruments, such as the stock market.
Yet, the prospect of improved earnings did not significantly lessen
the threat, as perceived by the PRC, that foreign competition might
drive local insurers into insolvency. Hence, the United States' con-
cerns about the PRC's potential for protectionist abuse of the second
criterion.
More generally, the interpretive dispute raised familiar questions -
could the PRC live up to a WTO bargain? Would it learn to behave
by the rule of law, not only in the international trade arena, but also
in its domestic setting by implementing profound changes in its legal
system?
Another excellent example of post-bilateral deal squabbling con-
cerned banking services. The deal did not place any local currency
lending restrictions on foreign bank branches doing business in
China. In March 2000, the People's Bank of China proposed a limit
on lending in renminbi to four times (or sometimes eight times) the
operating capital of the Chinese branch of a foreign bank. Signifi-
cantly, the operating capital of that foreign bank branch's home of-
fice would not be eligible for consideration. Under China's existing
rules, the operating capital of foreign bank branches had to be be-
tween thirty million and 300 million renminbi (approximately S3-S 10
million).
These proposed rules were not entirely irrational. What if the loans
made by a foreign bank branch went bad? If the branch did not have
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adequate capital to absorb the loss resulting from the write-off of bad
loans, then the People's Bank might be forced to help rescue the
branch (say, for example, by extending credit). This is because if the
branch collapsed, it would not be able to pay off its creditors on other
transactions in which it had engaged. Systemic risk-a chain of bank
failures-might set in, causing a broader public panic. Was this not
precisely the fear of central banks worldwide in so many interna-
tional banking problems, most notoriously the 1991 Bank of Credit
and Commerce International (BCCI) crisis? To respond, foreign
banks only needed to transfer more capital to their Chinese branches.
Most had been keeping only the minimum of thirty million renminbi.
The PRC had one other plausible argument: the proposed lending
limits would apply equally to foreign and domestic banks. Therefore,
there would be no violation of the national treatment provision of
GATS Article XVI: 1.
However, the problem with the Chinese position was how the
People's Bank defined "adequate" capitalization, given that the No-
vember 15 bilateral deal had failed to spell this out. At what point
does "adequate" become protectionist? After all, the smaller the pool
of funds that a foreign bank branch can count as capital, and the
lower the multiple of that pool the branch can lend in local currency,
the more protectionist the requirement. Local Chinese banks will
have less to fear in the way of "big" foreign banks leveraging off of
their world-wide capital bases, because the People's Bank require-
ment is insulating the local banks from the competitive effects of the
differential capital bases. Indeed, the operating capital of many Chi-
nese banks was reported to be greater than many foreign bank
branches in the PRC.
Even if the squabble over lending limits could be resolved, foreign
banks were still hemmed in by the PRC's interest rate policies. Inter-
est rates in the PRC had yet to be deregulated, and a robust inter-
bank lending market had yet to develop. Absent these occurrences, it
would be difficult for foreign banks to compete with local banks be-
cause regulated interest rates were a direct subsidy to Chinese banks.
The government-mandated limits on what any bank (foreign or do-
mestic) could pay depositors meant foreign banks could not compete
with local ones by offering higher interest-earning accounts. Moreo-
ver, without a liquid inter-bank market, foreign banks were limited in
their borrowing and lending operations. Their funding sources
1522 [15:1469
CHINA "S ACCESSION TO THE WTO
(through inter-bank borrowing), and income-generating opportunities
(through inter-bank lending), would be limited. International trade
law was of no help either. Neither the November 15 bilateral agree-
ment, nor the GATT-WTO rules, discussed interest rate deregulation
or inter-bank markets.
Finally, conclusion of the bilateral agreement was marred by the
reminder that unresolved problems in United States-Sino relations
remained. The biggest example was, of course, Taiwan. Would the
PRC now support Taiwanese accession? Would it emphasize peace-
ful reunification? How would it approach American regional security
initiatives? A PRC "in from the cold" would likely to be hostile or
fractious. However, better integration into the world trading system
still had to transform strategic rivalry into strategic competition, or
better yet, into strategic partnership.
B. IGNITING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN CHINA
History may have been repeating itself with the November 15,
1999 bilateral agreement. The Dragon was being carved up, possibly
by foreign-principally, American-economic interests for the sec-
ond time in two centuries. Maybe Premier Zhu had "sold" China to
these interests. Perhaps he had to, because hard-liners in the Chinese
Communist Party had shown little inclination to press reforms. The
WTO accession process needed an external stimulus. Maybe Premier
Zhu was not so much selling as betting-betting that participation in
a market-oriented, open-trading system would lead to a brighter fu-
ture than the past half-century of Maoism and socialist direction.
Perhaps that Zhu was following Benjamin Franklin's remark that "no
nation was ever ruined by trade."
SOEs posed a particular problem. There was great concern about
weaning SOEs off of government milk. Would unemployment and
the gap between rich and poor increase so dramatically that social in-
stability would result? Certain sectors were particularly worrisome.
As the world's biggest steel producer, the PRC boasted thousands of
steel companies; however, only four were thought to be internation-
ally competitive. In cement, the PRC had 8,000 plants, but most of
them operated below the optimal production scale of one million tons
annually. In agriculture, each Chinese worker farmed on average 0.1
hectares, whereas the average American farmer had 1.4 hectares, and
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the average European farmer tilled 0.5 hectares. Small wonder that
Chinese agricultural produce prices were as much as thirty percent
higher than world-market levels. With the decline in tariffs, would
the PRC be flooded with cheaper, higher quality steel, cement, and
agricultural produce? Furthermore, the PRC's four major state-
owned banks habitually lend to SOEs, which are the most troubled
economic actors, but are restricted in lending to private companies,
which are far more vibrant. Not surprisingly, therefore, in January
2000, the Financial Times reported that the state-owned banks were
estimated to have bad loans equal to twenty-five percent of their as-
sets. Were the central government to repair the balance sheets of
state-owned banks through re-capitalization, government debt as a
percentage of GDP would increase to almost fifty percent. Thus,
many feared that once foreign banks began competing with state-
owned banks, there would be a run on the latter.
Moreover, the nation's system of government was at issue. Maybe
the deal was the beginning of the end of Party control. As The
Economist said, the "central question" is:
[W]hether Chinese Communism will be strengthened by membership
of the WTO - as China's leaders must hope - or be ruined by it ..... The
liberalisations that China has offered are sweeping .... and the main ones
begin on the date of accession ..... China's poor farmers, most of whom
eke a living from tiny plots, now face competition from America's effi-
cient agri-business. Industrial state companies will no longer be able to
hide behind high tariffs and other barriers. State trading companies will
no longer have a lock on imports. The telecom industry will be thrown
open to foreigners. Foreign banks, at present constrained in what they can
do and where they can go, will be freed. In other words, the state sector,
the bastion of the Communist Party's power, will everywhere be under-
mined.
Why on earth should China's leaders have signed up to such an tin-
dermining? One answer is that many of them have not. This is a victory
for the "reformers": Mr. Jiang, who seems to think that the kudos gained
abroad by taking China into the WTO will soon rub off on him at home,
and Mr. Zhu, who believes more strongly in membership on its own mer-
its. Neither, however, is exactly a free-market liberal. They seem rather to
have been swayed by two main arguments. One is that WTO membership
will go a long way to securing for China the place at the high table of na-
tions that most Chinese believe is theirs by right. The other, more imme-
diately practical, argument is that China will benefit in terms of new jobs
and fresh flows of foreign investment in a reinvigorated economy.
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At bottom, of course, the Communist Party has made a calculation
about how best to stay in power. Delivering prosperity, Party members
acknowledge, is now the touchstone of its legitimacy....
It is a gamble that may not pay off. The Chinese Communist Party is
used to being above the law. With the PRC in the WTO, it will have to
cede sovereignty -- upwards, to a rules-based, supranational body, and
downwards to individual consumers and private companies at the expense
of the state-industrial complex, the party's main base. To the extent that
WTO membership requires a strengthened rule of law, so an emboldened
judiciary might one-day be able to challenge Party decisions more effec-
tively.5
Also, the Chinese people may be the wellspring of revolution in
one form or another. WTO accession may mean the Party will need
to ask ordinary citizens to make significant sacrifices in the transition
to a market-oriented, globalized economy. Yet, it will have to make
this request just as it loosens its grip on the people's economic be-
havior, because decentralization of economic power will be at the
heart of the transition. For example, the government will have to pri-
vatize major state-owned banks, namely, the Bank of China, the
China Construction Bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China, and the Agricultural Bank of China. Privatization will limit or
eliminate the government's impact on lending policies. Instead of
being compelled to lend to SOEs or favored enterprises, newly pri-
vatized banks will apply commercial criteria to prospective borrow-
ers. In turn, government support for state-owned industry will erode.
Without the ability to direct credit, how will the Party keep the
state sector afloat? Surely, it will seek more taxes from decentralized
economic agents to help pay for cleaning up bankrupt SOEs and
covering social welfare costs. But, here the government will crash
into the paradoxical effect of WTO accession. On the one hand, the
Party will need the people more than ever. On the other hand, the
people will have more bargaining power than ever before, and may
even reject some Party requests. Peaceful compromise may well en-
tail greater participation in the Party (particularly if citizens are taxed
excessively without representation), and in senior levels of govern-
ment. That would be a democratic revolution - or perhaps better put,
a democratic evolution.
5. China Opens Up, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1999, at 17.
2000] 1525
AM. U. INTL L. REV.
Perhaps, then, Premier Zhu was "China's Gorbachev." Ask any
Russian about the Gorbachev legacy. It is hardly non-controversial.
Indeed, the possibility of igniting not just significant economic, but
also political change through WTO accession is a real one for Rus-
sia-and, for that matter, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, and the other
countries hoping to join the WTO club. For countries like Syria, Iran,
and Laos that are considering WTO accession, economic and politi-
cal change is a reality as well. Perhaps the accession process and its
aftermath will compel more fundamental capitalist and democratic
transformations, with all of the attendant problems as well as oppor-
tunities, in more countries than could ever have been imagined by a
sage like Ben Franklin.
It is important to realize that these transformations are not simply
legal ones. They are fundamental shifts in attitudes and culture at all
levels of government. Consider the fact that in March 1999, China
changed its Constitution to give private enterprises nearly equal
footing with the state sector. Private enterprises still face a harsh cli-
mate because of discriminatory regulations implemented by protec-
tionist government ministries. Unreconstructed officials continue to
mistrust private firms. These firms are outside the traditional Com-
munist Party system and, therefore, hard to control. Accordingly, the
idea firms could own important infrastructure like water and power
plants made officials uncomfortable.
Another example was the information technology sector. In Janu-
ary 2000, the government announced new rules aimed at preventing
the "leakage of state secrets" over the internet into foreign hands.
Internet companies became responsible for policing their own con-
tent in bulletin boards, chat rooms, news groups, etc., and the gov-
ernment had the right to close down offenders. The problem was the
definition of "state secret." It was so broad that it could encompass
any information not specifically approved for release. Prominent
American companies like Compaq, Dow Jones, Intel, International
Data Group, and Walden, plus major Japanese companies that had
invested in China's fledgling internet sector now were faced with un-
certainty and risk, thus raising the costs of financing their ventures.
Thus, as the Financial Times asked: How could the PRC - so proud
of this sector, and its strong pool of human capital - expect to foster
information technology if it could not relinquish significant control
over what people read and think?
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The PRC's new rules on encryption technology furnish another
example from the information technology of the reluctance of the
Communist Party to relinquish control. In October 1999, they prom-
ulgated the Commercial Encryption Management Regulations, which
took effect in January 2000. All foreign companies that used encryp-
tion technology had to register that technology with the newly cre-
ated "State Encryption Management Commission." Foreign compa-
nies could not import or distribute any unregistered encryption
technology in the PRC. The purpose of the regulations was to protect
the PRC's information security systems, as the government saw en-
cryption as a national security issue. It wanted to monitor all elec-
tronic communications, whether by e-mail, cell phone, or other form
of mass communication. In effect, it seemed that foreign companies
would have to hand over encryption technology to the government,
which would hold it in escrow and perhaps use it whenever it felt the
need to do so. As for all new encryption programs, it appeared they
would have to be written either by a Chinese company approved by
the government, or by a JV.
Even in the absence of ministry regulations, barriers remained that
highlighted the tussle between developing a freewheeling, vibrant
capitalist economy and maintaining discipline and social order. For
instance, there were no regulations forbidding private firms from
listing on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock markets. Yet, only a hand-
ful of private firms had floated securities on these exchanges because
the approval process for listing depended on recommendations from
local governments. That meant that what ought to be an entirely
market-oriented financial decision - whether and when to sell stock -
was a political one. The financial services sector provided another
example of the sea change needed. There was no law barring private
investment in financial services. Yet, as of January 2000, all securi-
ties firms were in the hands of the state. There was only one privately
owned bank - Minsheng Bank - and it required special approval to
form.
The bottom line is that the optimistic vision of a prosperous, sta-
ble, responsible China is by no means assured of fruition. No one
knows what will happen in China's post-WTO accession future - as
President Clinton himself admitted in his January 27, 2000 State of
the Union Address. The optimistic scenario for the PRC - and the
likes of Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria - assumes that govern-
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ments and the majority of their citizens will tolerate short- and me-
dium-term chaos over dictatorship because they envision long-term
stability through the prosperity of an open society. But as Karl Pop-
per teaches, the open society has had enemies no less distinguished
than Plato. Disappointments in economic restructuring, stagnation or
even contraction, and an unseemly rise in corruption, by which the
elite are enriched, assuredly will wreck the assumption. More than a
few governments will be tempted to react to the consequent social
tensions with old-style authoritarian political and economic meas-
ures, and GATT-WTO obligations be damned.
C. CAPITOL HILL POLITICS, REMAINING BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
AND ACCESSION AT LAST?
The November 15, 1999 bilateral agreement with the United States
was hardly the last step in the accession process, nor was it secured
early enough to ensure accession during the Seattle Ministerial Con-
ference. A protocol of accession would have to be agreed upon, fol-
lowed by a vote in the WTO General Council. But, that would be the
easy part. The WTO Working Party resumed its efforts to draft a
protocol in March 2000. The hard part was the battle looming on
Capitol Hill.
The Clinton Administration - backed by numerous business trade
groups, vowed to fight vigorously to pass permanent, unconditional
normal trade relations legislation (i.e., an exemption from the Jack-
son-Vanik Amendment) for the PRC. So too did the Republican
Congressional leadership, which saw PRC accession as integrally
related to the search for new markets for American farmers and busi-
nesses. Moreover, compliance with international legal obligations
was at stake. It would not do, under international law, to retain the
apparatus of renewing MFN treatment annually on the basis of a
Jackson-Vanik waiver, and condition such approval upon human
rights criteria. That be tantamount to conditional MFN status for the
PRC. Nor would it do to grant the PRC normal trade relations on an
annual basis and call the grant "unconditional.," GATT Article 1:1
demands unconditional treatment, and GATT jurisprudence (e.g., on
Article III questions) has seen through the dejure - defacto distinc-
tion.
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It was no secret why, in December 1999, the President personally
vowed an "all-out effort" to pass the legislation. Already united
against Clinton's Administration and Congressional allies stood the
familiar but odd coalition of labor unions, human rights activists,
conservative religious groups, consumer advocates, and some envi-
ronmental organizations. This coalition was emboldened by its "vic-
tory" at the Seattle Ministerial Conference in blocking the com-
mencement of a new Millennium Round of trade negotiations. Public
Citizen's Global Trade Watch, for example, opposed permanent
MiFN treatment, advocating annual renewal of normal trade relations
so as not to lose leverage over the PRC. Joining the coalition were
politicians convinced of the PRC's evil intention to undermine
America's national security by almost any means necessary. Many
opponents advocated non-application of GATT-WTO obligations
pursuant to GATT Article XXXV and WTO Agreement Article XIII.
Of course, these advocates nonchalantly dismissed the fact that non-
application would mean the PRC's market access concessions would
not benefit American businesses, but would inure to their European
and Asian competitors.
The coalition's case strengthened in February 2000. First, Vice
President Albert Gore, campaigning (successfully) for the Demo-
cratic Party's presidential nomination, told union leaders he favored
tougher labor and environmental standards and enforcement mecha-
nisms within the fabric of trade accords. To be sure, Gore said he
supported the PRC deal and WTO accession, but he did not encour-
age "big labor" - a key ally in his presidential quest - to reconsider its
opposition.
Second, the State Department, in its annual human rights report,
noted a marked deterioration in human rights, particularly freedom of
religion, expression, and association. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, offered a similar
denunciation shortly thereafter.
Third, the State Council issued a "White Paper" stating that the
PRC would resort to "all drastic measures possible, including the use
of force" to re-unify Taiwan if Taiwan refused "indefinitely" to ne-
gotiate the issue. It was not a "talk or fight" ultimatum, but it
sounded ominous enough. Not surprisingly, the White Paper was
haled by the military's mouthpiece, the People's Liberation ArmY
2000] 1529
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
Daily.
Were hard-liners in Beijing deliberately trying to sink the PRC's
chances of accession, and thereby the painful reforms Premier Zhu
was advocating? Was it a reckless attempt to stave off the inevitable
decentralization of power that would occur with accession? Or was it
just a crude attempt to discourage Taiwanese voters from backing
pro-independence candidates in a forthcoming election? Within a
week, Beijing denied that there had been any change in Taiwan pol-
icy. However, no one knew for sure, and the fact was, that on previ-
ous occasions the PRC had threatened attack only if Taiwan declared
independence or was occupied by a foreign power. The damage had
been done. The PRC's friends in the United States were put on the
defensive yet again over human rights and Taiwan.
CONCLUSION
Thus, throughout the spring of 2000, storm clouds gathered over
Capitol Hill on the issue of Permanent Normal Trade Relations, or
"PNTR," for the PRC. By early May, the pro-PNTR forces appeared
poised for a legislative victory. They had apparently persuaded
enough members of Congress that PNTR would be a strong signal to
reformers in Beijing, and it was in America's long-term interest to
engage the PRC constructively by supporting these reformers. Per-
haps, also, many in Congress had come to see that President
Clinton's characterization of the 15 November bilateral agreement
was correct: it was the "most one-sided trade deal in history." Thus,
on 25 May, the House of Representatives voted narrowly, but deci-
sively, to grant PNTR to the PRC. The vote was 237-197. As of this
writing, the Senate is expected to follow suit in the early fall of 2000.
There were sure to be at least two grand ironies for the Clinton
legacy. First, when the President initially had taken office, he had
expressly linked renewal of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment waiver
to the PRC's human rights performance. That same President would
go down as the prime catalyst behind the greatest trade deal between
the Eagle and the Dragon. He had rejected protectionist forces in his
own party, and followed every American head of state since Richard
Nixon as an enthusiast for constructive engagement to export democ-
racy and human rights. After all, three out of four Republicans voted
for the PNTR measure, while two out of three Democrats opposed it.
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Indeed, it was the third time President Clinton rebuffed his fellow
Democrats-the 1993 NAFTA Implementation Act, and the 1994
Uruguay Round Agreements Act being the first two occasions.
Second, the very House Republicans who in 1998 had impeached
the President because of Monica handed him his greatest foreign
policy triumph. The President needed them all the more in 2000 than
in 1993. Thirty nine percent of House Democrats (102 out of 258)
voted for NAFTA, while thirty-five percent (seventy-three out of
211) voted for PNTR.
However, the Capitol Hill storm over PNTR was not Beijing's
only worry. The PRC also had yet to finish bilateral agreements with
the EU and about a dozen other trading partners, including prominent
ones such as Mexico, and Switzerland, and less prominent ones like
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, and
Poland. (It was able to wrap up deals with Brazil, Cuba, Iceland,
Norway, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Uruguay in January 2000, with India
and the Philippines in February, with Argentina, Colombia, and
Thailand in March, and with Malaysia in April.) While some of these
Members had trading interests in the PRC that overlapped with the
United States, some did not, and no Member had interests identical
to those of the United States. India was a case in point. It demanded
improved market access for its softvare developers to work in the
PRC. Other Members could hold out for better deals, which would
then be "multi-lateralized" because of the MFN obligation.
For example, the EU said it found about eighty percent of the bi-
lateral agreement with the United States acceptable for itself. But, the
EU wanted deeper tariff cuts on automobiles, and on about 300-400
products that it exported to the PRC in larger volumes than did the
United States. These products included agricultural equipment, ce-
ramics, cognac, cosmetics, glassware, leather goods, machinery,
mandarin oranges, shoes, and spirits. The EU also sought at least the
same number of operating licenses for life insurers as the United
States obtained, and wanted the PRC to permit foreign life insurance
companies to take a controlling stake in JVs. Similarly, it sought
more than fifty percent foreign ownership of telecommunications op-
erators in fixed-line services, mobile-telephony, paging, and satellite
phones. The EU remained concerned about Chinese export perform-
ance requirements, whereby some foreign manufacturers were re-
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quired to export as much of seventy percent of their product made in
the PRC, and about conditions on product distribution and technol-
ogy transfer.
The Chinese refused to budge on equity percentage limitations in
the insurance and telecommunications sectors. They rightly asked the
EU rhetorically why the Europeans should get a concession denied to
the Americans. The EU Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, acqui-
esced, recognizing that the phased-in forty-nine percent and fifty
percent limits on mobile telecoms and insurance were a "political no-
go zone." The EU could not, and would not, push those matters any
further.
Fortunately, once again with Premier Zhu Rongji's personal in-
volvement, the Chinese did offer the EU a few concessions that
proved decisive.
- Tariff reductions. The PRC agreed to cut tariffs by forty per-
cent, to an average of 10.9 percent, on 150 products of particular in-
terest to the EU. Such products included ceramics, cosmetics,
leather, machinery, and spirits. Some of the tariff cuts would be dra-
matic: on cosmetics, from an average of thirty percent to ten percent;
on spirits, from sixty-five percent to ten percent.
- Agriculture. The PRC said it would reduce even further tar-
iffs and tariff-rate quotas on agricultural commodities of particular
interest to the EU, such as butter, mandarins, milk powder, olives,
pasta, rape oil, and wine.
* Automobiles. While the PRC brushed off the EU's demand
for further cuts in import tariffs, it did agree to relax restrictions on
JVs in car, van, and truck production.
- Distribution. The PRC promised to lift equity restrictions on
large department store joint ventures, allowing them to run wholly-
owned networks. It also promised to eliminate rules prescribing the
maximum size (i.e., floor space) of foreign-owned stores. Accord-
ingly, it would be easier for the likes of European retailers such as
Ahold, Carrefour, and Ikea to do business in the PRC.
- SOEs. The PRC agreed to end its state trading monopoly on
imports of crude and processed oil, and on fertilizer. Private traders
would be allowed to import these items, hence state companies like
Sinopec and Sinochem would lose their power to fix prices (which
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they often exercised, setting the prices at below world-market lev-
els). As soon as the PRC acceded to the WTO, foreign oil and oil
produce exporters (e.g., European giants like BP and Royal
Dutch/Shell) would be permitted to sell twenty percent of their ex-
ports to the PRC to non-SOEs at market prices. This percentage
would rise to 100 percent, in fifteen percent increments each year
following accession. Fertilizer exporters (e.g., Germany's BASF)
would be able to export a quota equal to 2.7 million tons annually,
with an in-quota tariff rate of four percent. They could carry over to
the subsequent year any unused portion of the in-quota amount. Fi-
nally, the PRC's export monopoly on silk would be liberalized.
- Legal services. The PRC promised foreign law firms could
offer advice on Chinese law, and restrictions on their recruitment of
attorneys would be eased.
Moreover, even in the insurance and telecommunications sectors,
the PRC came up with a creative solution. The PRC promised an ad-
ditional seven licenses within three months to European insurers (in
both the life and non-life insurance sectors), and to advance by two
years the dates by which foreign companies could form JVs in life
insurance and mobile telephony. Thus, for example, a mobile tele-
com. company would be able to take a twenty-five percent stake in a
JV upon the PRC's accession, a thirty-five percent stake after one
year, and a forty-nine percent stake after three years.
Arguably, some of these offers were of dubious value. The PRC
was likely to liberalize its state monopolies on oil imports and silk
exports, regardless of the WTO accession process. As for distribu-
tion, not too many Chinese yet had the purchasing power to do any-
thing but window shop at the likes of Galleries Lafayette or Prin-
temps.
Still, on balance, the offer was good enough for the EU. On 19
May, the two sides signed a bilateral concession agreement that
contained the aforementioned points, all of which would apply to
every WTO Member when the PRC joined the WTO. With the EU
deal, and passage of PNTR in the House of Representatives, the saga
of China's accession to the WTO was nearing an end.
At long last, the Dragon appears about to enter.
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